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Deporting Undesirable Women 
 
Pooja R. Dadhania 
Immigration law has long labeled certain categories of immigrants 
“undesirable.” One of the longest-standing of these categories is women 
who sell sex. Current immigration laws subject sellers of sex to an 
inconsistent array of harsh immigration penalties, including bars to entry 
to the United States as well as mandatory detention and removal. A 
historical review of prostitution-related immigration laws reveals 
troubling origins. Grounded in turn-of-the-twentieth-century morality, 
these laws singled out female sellers of sex as immoral and as threats to 
American marriages and families. Indeed, the first such law specifically 
targeted Asian women as threats to the moral fabric of the United States 
due to their perceived sexual deviance. Subsequent laws built upon these 
problematic foundations, largely without reexamining the initial goal of 
safeguarding American morality from the ostensible sexual threat of 
noncitizen women. This dark history casts a long shadow, and current 
laws remain rooted in these archaic notions of morality by continuing to 
focus penalties on sellers of sex (who tend to be women), without 
reciprocal penalties for buyers (who tend to be men). Contemporary 
societal views on sellers of sex have changed, however, as society has come 
to increasingly tolerate and accept sexual conduct outside the bounds of 
marriage. Although societal views surrounding prostitution remain 
complex, there is an increased understanding of the different motivations 
of sellers of sex, as well as a recognition that individuals forced into 
prostitution are victims who need protection. Prostitution-related 
immigration laws should be reformed to no longer penalize sellers of sex, 
both to bring immigration law in line with modern attitudes towards 
sellers of sex and to mitigate the discriminatory effect of the archaic and 
 
 Assistant Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. The author is grateful for invaluable 
comments from Jane Aiken, Deborah Epstein, Philip Genty, Vivek Narayanadas, Christina Ponsa-
Kraus, Andrew Schoenholtz, Philip Schrag, and Robin West, as well as workshop participants at the 
Moot Workshop at Columbia Law School, Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop at NYU School of 
Law, Fellows’ Collaborative Workshop at Georgetown University Law Center, and the Emerging 
Immigration Scholars Conference at Texas A&M University School of Law. The author thanks Thanh 
D. Nguyen for excellent research assistance. 
First to Printer_Dadhania (Do Not Delete) 10/2/2018  1:40 PM 
54 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:53 
gendered moral underpinnings that initially gave rise to and continue to 
show in these laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ms. Zhang1 is a Chinese woman who fled to the United States over twenty 
years ago to escape horrific persecution. She was granted asylum, but her story does 
not end there. Ms. Zhang struggled to get on her feet in the United State as a result 
of ongoing psychological trauma and limited English proficiency. A few years after 
she received asylum, Ms. Zhang had her first contact with the criminal justice 
system when she was arrested in a neighborhood known for prostitution.2 She was 
 
1. Name has been changed to protect her privacy. 
2. This Article will use the term “prostitution” to refer to the sale of sexual services, which is 
the term used in immigration and criminal laws. This Article will use the term “sellers of sex” to refer 
to individuals who provide sexual services in exchange for money, goods, or services, including both 
those who sell sex as a result of force, fraud, or coercion, and those who choose to sell sex. This Article 
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not convicted of any crime. It is not clear whether Ms. Zhang in fact engaged in any 
prostitution-related activities. However, over the next few years, due to her actions 
or perhaps the fact that she was in locations where prostitution occurred or was 
now suspected by the police to be involved in prostitution, she continued to be 
targeted for arrest.3 She was convicted of a few prostitution-related misdemeanors 
for intent to engage in prostitution. Ms. Zhang served hardly any prison time. 
Ms. Zhang applied for lawful permanent resident status and her application 
was denied due to her prostitution-related convictions.4 Although the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) often initiates removal proceedings after denying 
applications for such status, it did not try to deport Ms. Zhang because prostitution-
related crimes are not considered serious enough to warrant the deportation of an 
asylee who fears persecution in her home country.5 Almost a decade later, after no 
new contacts with the criminal justice system, Ms. Zhang again applied for lawful 
permanent resident status, and her application remains pending. If it is approved 
and she receives lawful permanent resident status, she could face deportation if the 
police target her again for prostitution-related crimes because lawful permanent 
residents, unlike asylees, can be deported for prostitution.6 
Ms. Zhang’s experience highlights many of the troubling facets of 
prostitution-related immigration laws, which have long-labelled noncitizens like her 
“undesirable.”7 First, there can be grave immigration consequences for selling sex, 
or even being suspected of selling sex, despite minimal criminal penalties. Second, 
prostitution-related immigration laws have targeted sellers of sex, who are often 
female. Third, immigration law treats prostitution-related conduct inconsistently, 
mandating severe penalties while at the same time providing for relief, waivers, and 
exceptions. 
 
acknowledges that prostitution, even when it is a choice, can be exploitative and the result of structures 
of oppression. See Corey S. Shdaimah et al., Introduction to CHALLENGING PERSPECTIVES ON STREET-
BASED SEX WORK 9 (Katie Hail-Jares et al. eds., 2017) (“[T]his form of work is often exploitative, and 
in a world that is overwhelmingly capitalist and patriarchal, viewing sex work as a fully free choice 
separate from structures and mores of oppression may be unrealistic or naive.”). This Article does not 
use “prostitute” (except when referring to or quoting from legislation, case law, or other historical 
sources), which can be a stigmatizing term that has social and moral undertones. This Article uses “sex 
worker” or “sex work” only in relation to the voluntary sale of sex as a form of employment. 
3. See infra note 248 (discussing arrests for prostitution based on stereotyping); see also THE 
URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR: AN ANALYSIS OF STREET-BASED PROSTITUTION IN 
NEW YORK CITY 5, 40–42 (2003), http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/RevolvingDoor.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PD5L-W6A4] (describing the harassment of sex workers in the form of false 
arrests). 
4. With her application for permanent resident status, Ms. Zhang applied for a waiver of 
inadmissibility to overcome her prostitution convictions, but it too was denied. See infra note 178 and 
accompanying text (describing waiver of inadmissibility). 
5. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). 
6. See infra Part II.B (describing the crimes involving moral turpitude ground of deportability). 
7. See infra Part I (describing how legislators labeled noncitizens involved or suspected of 
involvement in prostitution “undesirable”). 
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The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prescribes significant penalties 
for prostitution and related conduct. Selling sex can bar noncitizens from entering 
the United States, through either the denial of a visa or entry at the United States 
border under the inadmissibility grounds.8 Prostitution-related activities can trigger 
removal proceedings to deport a noncitizen, even a lawful permanent resident, 
under the crimes involving moral turpitude deportability provision.9 Such activities 
can also subject a noncitizen to mandatory detention during the pendency of 
removal proceedings.10 Notably, certain penalties apply only to sellers of sex, and 
not to buyers. 
To understand the current state of prostitution-related immigration laws, 
namely the focus on sellers of sex, this Article analyzes the historical development 
of such laws. Tracing this evolution, Part I shows that prostitution-related 
immigration laws developed primarily in the late 1800s and early 1900s to respond 
to the singular concern about the threat of the sexuality of noncitizen women to 
American morality. Part II analyzes the current legal landscape of prostitution-
related immigration laws, which reveals that these morality-based origins continue 
to permeate the laws through a continued targeting of sellers of sex, generally 
women. Part III discusses contemporary societal perceptions of sellers of sex, 
illustrated by criminal law, and shows that sellers of sex generally are no longer 
viewed as immoral even though views on prostitution remain complex. In light of 
changed perceptions of sellers of sex, Part IV recommends that prostitution-related 
immigration laws be reexamined and ultimately reformed by Congress and 
reinterpreted by the courts to no longer penalize sellers of sex. 
Especially under the Trump administration, immigration penalties are a real 
threat to noncitizens suspected of prostitution. Immigration law has long been a 
tool that has been manipulated to target vulnerable and unpopular groups, and it is 
now being wielded like a blunt instrument by the Trump administration. Any 
noncitizen who has a run-in with law enforcement, whether ultimately convicted or 
not, is at risk of deportation under this administration’s policies.11 These policies 
 
8. See INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D); INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Admission is defined as “lawful entry of the alien into the United States after 
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13)(A). 
9. INA § 237(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A). 
10. INA § 236(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody 
any alien who . . . is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 
1182(a)(2) . . . .”). Section 212(a)(2) of the INA includes the prostitution-related ground of 
inadmissibility, in addition to the crimes involving moral turpitude ground. INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2). 
11. This administration is explicitly targeting for removal noncitizens who “have been convicted 
of any criminal offense” and noncitizens who “have been charged with any criminal offense that has not 
been resolved.” See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. et al., Enforcement of the Immigration 
Laws to Serve the National Interest 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PT3W-DPY6] (emphasis added). Fears of deportation are not unfounded—
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are especially problematic in the context of prostitution, where a conviction is not 
needed for immigration penalties to attach, and where women like Ms. Zhang can 
be arrested and charged, but later have their charges dropped.12 Eliminating 
immigration penalties for prostitution thus offers a small but significant step 
towards protecting vulnerable populations that have had a long history of being 
targeted by morality-based provisions. 
I. HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION-RELATED IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 
Prostitution-related immigration laws have a dark history—under the 
justification of protecting “American” morality, they labeled noncitizen women as 
“undesirable” and targeted them for their perceived sexuality.13 Conceptions of 
American morality around the turn of the twentieth century accepted sexual 
intercourse only within the confines of monogamous marriage. Even when they 
were forced into prostitution, women, especially noncitizen women, were blamed 
as the primary threats to monogamous marriage, rather than the men who bought 
sex. The first federal prostitution-related immigration law in 1875 targeted 
noncitizen women, focusing on Chinese women, who were viewed as sexually 
deviant and thus serious threats to white families.14 The bulk of prostitution-related 
immigration laws developed in the next several decades, continuing to use the 
protection of American morality as their justification to single out noncitizen 
women for increasingly harsh penalties. 
A. Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration (Page Law) (1875) 
The first federal immigration law to target prostitution was the Page Law, 
enacted in 1875.15 The Page Law, passed in the context of rising anti-Chinese 
sentiment, targeted Chinese women as “undesirable” immigrants due to the 
 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents have targeted noncitizens at their court 
appearances, including at the Human Trafficking Intervention Court in New York City, which is 
designed to provide rehabilitative services to individuals charged with prostitution. See Beth Fertig, 
When ICE Shows Up in Human Trafficking Courts, WNYC ( June 22, 2017), http://www.wnyc.org/
story/when-ice-shows-court/; see also Press Release, Immigrant Def. Project, IDP Unveils New 
Statistics & Trends Detailing Statewide ICE Courthouse Arrests in 2017 (Dec. 31, 2017),  
https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ICE-Courthouse-Arrests-Stats-Trends- 
2017-Press-Release-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y3G-LC8A] (reporting over 1200% increase from 
2016 to 2017 in reports of ICE arrests or attempted arrests in New York courts). 
12. See JOHN F. DECKER, PROSTITUTION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 104–06 (1979); supra 
note 3 (describing false arrests to harass individuals suspected of prostitution and arrests based on 
stereotyping). Additionally, because a conviction is not needed to trigger the prostitution inadmissibility 
ground, even an arrest for prostitution can arouse the suspicion of immigration officials and 
adjudicators. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
13. See generally Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 647 (2005) (“[R]egulation of marriage and the family and the implementation 
of population policy are at the root of much of American immigration law.”). 
14. Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration (Page Law), ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 
(1875) (repealed 1974); see also infra Part I.A (discussing the legislative history of the Page Law). 
15. 18 Stat. 477. 
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perceived threat they posed to American morality through their potential to bring 
prostitution to the United States and thereby corrupt white families.16 
The Page Law restricted the entry of women coming to the United States to 
engage in prostitution, and specifically targeted women from East Asia for 
additional restrictions.17 Section 5 made it unlawful for “women ‘imported for the 
purposes of prostitution’” to “immigrate into” the United States.18 Noncitizens 
were subject to screening upon arrival in the United States to determine whether 
they were coming for purposes of prostitution.19 Section 1 specifically targeted 
individuals from “China, Japan, or any Oriental country” for additional screening at 
a port of embarkation to determine whether they had “entered into a contract or 
agreement . . . for lewd and immoral purposes.”20 Women from these Asian 
countries needed to obtain certificates of immigration before embarking for the 
United States.21 This section also criminalized the importation of women into the 
United States for the purposes of prostitution.22 
Rising anti-Chinese sentiment in the wake of increased Chinese immigration 
to the United States was the backdrop for the Page Law, as white Americans felt 
threatened by the changing character of California.23 Less than a decade after the 
enactment of the Page Law, Congress passed the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act 
in 1882, which further codified this anti-Chinese sentiment by halting the 
immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States, in addition to barring Chinese 
individuals from naturalizing.24 In the midst of this anti-Chinese hostility, the Page 
 
16. Not only was the Page Law the first federal immigration law to target prostitution, it was 
also the first federal immigration law to restrict generally the entry of “undesirable” noncitizens into 
the United States. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 1798–1965, at 66 (1981) (“From this beginning [the 1875 Act], exclusion was to develop into 
a major instrument of immigration policy.”). Before 1875, states generally individually regulated 
immigration. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, 
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19–43 (1996) (describing state laws regulating immigration prior 
to the Page Law); Abrams, supra note 13, at 645, 664–77 (same). 
17. In addition to prostitution, the Page Law also imposed penalties on the importation of 
coolie labor, which had previously been criminalized by the Coolie Trade Prohibition Act. See §§ 2, 4, 
18 Stat. 477; Act of Feb. 19, 1862 (Coolie Trade Prohibition Act), ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (repealed 1974); 
see also RONALD J. TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN 
AMERICANS 36 (1990) (defining the term “coolie” as “unfree laborers who had been kidnapped or 
pressed into service by coercion and shipped to foreign countries”). 
18. § 5, 18 Stat. 477. 
19. Id. This screening upon arrival in the United States was not limited to Asian women. See id. 
20. Id. § 1; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 641, 695–96. 
21. § 1, 18 Stat. 477; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 698–702 (discussing immigration process 
for Chinese women under Page Law). 
22. § 3, 18 Stat. 477 (making it a felony for “knowingly and willfully import[ing], or caus[ing] 
any importation of, women into the United States for the purposes of prostitution . . . .”). In addition 
to targeting prostitution, the Page Law made it unlawful for “persons . . . undergoing a sentence for 
conviction in their own country of felonious crimes” to enter the United States, excluding political 
prisoners. Id. § 5. 
23. The first Chinese immigrants arrived in California in the late 1840s, and by 1880, there were 
over 75,000 Chinese immigrants in California. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 649–50. 
24. Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). 
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Law was passed to protect white American families from the perceived sexual threat 
of Chinese women.25 The perceived threat was two-fold—the threat that permitting 
the entry of Chinese women would bring prostitution to the United States as well 
as lead to the birth of Chinese-origin United States citizens, further decreasing the 
percentage of white Americans and changing the character of the electorate on the 
West Coast.26 
Before the passage of the Page Law, President Ulysses Grant addressed 
Congress in 1874, calling for immigration legislation against the “evil practice” of 
prostitution by Chinese women.27 He explained that “[h]ardly a perceptible 
percentage of [Chinese women] perform any honorable labor, but they are brought 
for shameful purposes, to the disgrace of the communities where settled and to the 
great demoralization of the youth of these localities.”28 The legislative history of the 
Page Law mirrors President Grant’s views and shows that the legislation’s 
uncontroversial goal was to protect white families from the perceived sexual 
deviance of Chinese women by restricting their immigration.29 California 
Congressman Horace F. Page, the bill’s sponsor, explained the purpose of the Page 
Law as curbing the decline that Chinese women were causing in the morality of 
white Americans in California. He described white Americans as “stout-hearted 
 
25. In particular, Americans focused on the differences between prevailing sexual norms in 
China and the United States—most notably prostitution, but also concubinage and polygamy, which 
were accepted in Chinese society. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND 
THE NATION 136 (2000); Abrams, supra note 13, at 642–43. In 1870, an estimated fifty to seventy 
percent of the over two thousand Chinese women living in San Francisco were sellers of sex. See 
GEORGE ANTHONY PEFFER, IF THEY DON’T BRING THEIR WOMEN HERE: CHINESE FEMALE 
IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION 6, 11, 124 n.13 (1999); BENSON TONG, UNSUBMISSIVE WOMEN 
15 (1994); JUDY YUNG, UNBOUND FEET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF CHINESE WOMEN IN SAN 
FRANCISCO 19, 45–46, 320 n.89 (1995). But see COTT, supra note 25, at 137 (“The Page Act was sparked 
less by the scale of Chinese prostitution, which was small, than by what it banefully represented.”). 
26. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 661–63 (arguing that Chinese women who emigrated to the 
United States were viewed as presenting a “threat of reproduction” through the potential for the birth 
of Chinese-origin United States citizens and for miscegenation). 
27. Id. at 691 (quoting 3 CONG. REC. 3–4 (1874)). 
28. Id. (quoting 3 CONG. REC. 3–4 (1874)); see also HUTCHINSON, supra note 16, at 65 (citing  
S. 971, 37th Cong. 1188 (1861); H.R. 1588, 37th Cong. 3895 (1861)). Even though there was a 
recognition that Chinese women could be forced or coerced into prostitution, they were nevertheless 
viewed as a threat because their perceived “slavish character” made them more susceptible to being 
forced or coerced. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 658 (“White women ‘so much better understood’ their 
rights that they were less likely to be duped into indentured servitude and were therefore less of a moral 
threat” (quoting S. REP. NO. 44-689, at 146–48 (1877) (statement of Alfred Clarke, Clerk at the San 
Francisco Police Department)).). 
29. See COTT, supra note 25, at 137–38 (“The Chinese prostitute, standing outside of and boding 
no good for Christian-model monogamy, signified the threat to American values in Chinese 
immigration . . . .”); Abrams, supra note 13, at 692–95 (detailing legislative history); supra note 25 
(describing the differences in sexual norms between the United States and China and providing 
estimates of the rate of prostitution among Chinese women in San Francisco); see also STAFF OF  
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 7 (Comm. Print 
1988) (“[The Page Law] was unaccompanied by printed reports or any House or Senate floor debate, 
apparently because of its noncontroversial nature.”). 
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people” who had come to California “with their wives and children,” but were now 
threatened by a “deadly blight.”30 His bill aimed to “‘place a dividing line between 
vice and virtue’ and ‘send the brazen harlot who openly flaunts her wickedness in 
the faces of our wives and daughters back to her native country.’”31 Senator 
Cornelius Cole described Chinese women as “the most undesirable of population, 
who spread disease and moral death among our white population.”32 These 
statements, which cast blame for prostitution solely upon noncitizen women, 
conspicuously fail to mention the role of buyers, a pervasive theme in prostitution-
related immigration legislation. 
The practical effect of the Page Law was an almost complete halt of the 
immigration of Chinese women.33 The Page Law, which remained on the books for 
almost a century, was only the beginning of morality-based immigration legislation 
targeting noncitizen women as the bad actors. 
B. An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into The United States (1903) 
In 1903, Congress passed a comprehensive piece of immigration legislation 
that strengthened the provisions of the Page Law for the same purpose—to protect 
American morality from noncitizen women.34 This law did not single out any 
particular race like the Page Law and was used to begin targeting new communities 
of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe in addition to Asian women.35 
The 1903 Act enumerated expansive “classes of aliens” who were “excluded 
from admission into the United States.”36 These classes included “prostitutes, and 
persons who procure or attempt to bring in prostitutes or women for the purpose 
of prostitution.”37 This inclusion was uncontroversial—the legislative history found 
 
30. Abrams, supra note 13, at 694 (quoting 3 CONG. REC. APPX. 44 (1875)). 
31. Id. at 692–95 & n.331 (quoting 3 CONG. REC. APPX. 44 (1875)). 
32. Abrams, supra note 13, at 663 (quoting Cornelius Cole: The Senator Interviewed by a Chronicle 
Reporter, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 1870, at 1). 
33. See COTT, supra note 25, at 138 (discussing the impact of the Page Law on the population 
of Chinese women in California); PEFFER, supra note 25, at 9 (describing how government officials 
“demonstrated a consistent unwillingness, or inability, to recognize [Chinese] women who were not 
prostitutes among all but wealthy applicants for immigration”); Todd Stevens, Tender Ties: Husbands’ 
Rights and Racial Exclusion in Chinese Marriage Cases, 1882–1924, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 272 
(2002) (identifying one of the reasons that low numbers of Chinese women immigrated to the United 
States as “restrictive U.S. immigration laws, especially those concerning prostitution”). 
34. Immigration Act of 1903 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United 
States), ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213; see also infra notes 35, 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing the 
motivations underlying the passage of the 1903 Act). 
35. See MARTHA GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION, AND 
CITIZENSHIP, 1870–1965, at 60–62 (2005) (“When the Immigration Acts of 1903, 1907, and 1910 
reiterated general restrictions against prostitutes, the application of the policy was redirected toward 
new European arrivals.”). 
36. § 2, 32 Stat. 1213. The March 3, 1891 Act first enumerated a class of noncitizens excluded 
from admission. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084. 
37. § 2, 32 Stat. 1213; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 355 (1950) (“The barring of immigrants 
on moral grounds was among the very first exclusion clauses.”). A conviction for prostitution  
was not required for exclusion, which remains the law today under the prostitution-related  
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it “unnecessary to offer any justification for adding such aliens to the excluded 
classes, since they . . . conduce to the moral and physical degradation of the 
American people.”38 The 1903 Act explicitly shifted the focus of prostitution-
related immigration laws to admission and exclusion.39 
Although the 1903 Act removed some of the explicit references to women, it 
still continued to single them out, implying only women could be sellers of sex.40 It 
also retained the language from the Page Law making it a felony for anyone to 
import into the United States “any woman or girl for the purposes of prostitution.”41 
The 1903 Act’s prostitution-related provisions continued to reflect concern 
over the threat of prostitution by noncitizen women to American morality.42 
Leading to the passage of the 1903 law, President Theodore Roosevelt encouraged 
Congress to take action in his annual message in 1901, finding the “present 
immigration laws unsatisfactory.”43 He specifically encouraged Congress to “aim to 
exclude absolutely . . . all persons who are of a low moral tendency or of unsavory 
reputation.”44 The Industrial Commission, a government agency tasked with 
producing reports on various issues including immigration, recommended in 1902 
in a draft bill that Congress exclude “prostitutes and persons who procure or 
attempt to bring in prostitutes or women for the purpose of prostitution,” which is 
language that was adopted wholesale in the 1903 Act.45 
The morality-based rationale for prostitution-related immigration laws thus 
persisted, continuing to point the finger at noncitizen women. Fears surrounding 
 
inadmissibility ground. See infra text accompanying note 128. In addition to prostitutes, “idiots, insane 
persons . . . ; persons likely to become a public charge; . . . polygamists, anarchists, or persons  
who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United 
States . . . .” were also included in the classes of aliens to be excluded admission. § 2, 32 Stat. at  
1213. This Act also included a deportation provision within two years after entry for any noncitizen 
who entered the United States “in violation of the law.” Id. § 20. 
38. See S. REP. NO. 57-2119, at 2 (1902). The legislative history also justified these provisions 
because such noncitizens could “become public charges within a short time . . . .” Id. 
39. See § 2, 32 Stat. 1213. Legislative history noted the failure of the Page Law to directly address 
admission. See 35 CONG. REC. 5764 (1902) (“The part of the bill in relation to prostitutes and procurers 
is to complete the evident purpose of the act of March 3, 1875, which makes the importation of such 
aliens a felony, but omits to provide for rejection at ports of the United States.”). The 1903 Act retained 
criminal penalties for “the importation into the United States of any woman or girl for the purposes of 
prostitution . . . .” § 3, 32 Stat. 1213. 
40. See supra text accompanying note 37. Some references to sellers of sex in the 1903 Act were 
gender-neutral, whereas the Page Law referred only to women. Compare Page Law, ch. 141, § 5, 18  
Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974), with § 2, 32 Stat. 1213. 
41. See § 3, 32 Stat. 1213 (emphasis added). 
42. These concerns may have been unfounded. See Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage 
and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 766–68 & n.29 (2006) (summarizing the scholarship on 
whether early-twentieth century reformers identified a true problem or stirred up an unfounded moral 
panic). 
43. HUTCHINSON, supra note 16, at 127 (quoting 57 CONG. REC. 35 (1901)). 
44. Id. (quoting 57 CONG. REC. 35 (1901)). 
45. Id. at 128–29 (citing FINAL REP. OF THE INDUS. COMM’N, VOL. XIX, H.R. DOC. NO. 380, 
at 1015 (1902)). 
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the sexuality of noncitizen women only served to make subsequent laws more 
stringent. 
C. An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States (1907) and 
Amendments (1910) 
Several years later, Congress passed comprehensive immigration legislation in 
1907 and amendments in 1910, which again toughened the provisions related to 
prostitution. The purpose of these laws continued to be the protection of 
Americans from the “undesirable” sexual practices of noncitizen women, who were 
labeled as bad actors even in cases of forced prostitution.46 
Whereas previous laws focused on exclusion at the border, the 1907 Act added 
a deportation provision, which enabled immigration officers to enforce 
prostitution-related immigration laws in the interior of the United States for conduct 
committed after entry. Section 3 of the 1907 Act provided that “any alien woman 
or girl who shall be found an inmate of a house of prostitution or practicing 
prostitution, at any time within three years after she shall have entered the United 
States, shall be deemed to be unlawfully within the United States, and shall be 
deported . . . .”47 A conviction for prostitution was not required before a noncitizen 
female could be deported.48 This deportation provision reflected Congress’s  
new interest in monitoring the behavior of noncitizens after entry into the United 
States. 
Women continued to be singled out as sellers of sex. The 1907 Act retained 
the exclusion provisions from prior legislation and continued to prohibit women 
and girls from entering the United States for the purpose of prostitution.49 Congress 
also inserted a new provision to exclude “women or girls coming into the United 
States . . . for any other immoral purpose,” a catchall term for other undesirable 
sexual practices.50 The 1907 Act also modified and broadened the criminal 
provisions related to the importation of women and girls into the United States for 
 
46. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United 
States), ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898; infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
47. § 3, 34 Stat. 898. From 1908 to 1948, 14,814 noncitizens were deported under the provisions 
targeting immoral behavior. See S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 873 (1950). This statute also criminalized 
harboring any alien woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution. Id. The Supreme Court held that  
this portion of the statute was unconstitutional because it encroached on the police powers of the  
states. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909). The 1910 amendments to this statute amended the 
unconstitutional language of the 1907 Act. Act of March 26, 1910 (An Act to Amend an Act Entitled 
“An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States”), ch. 128, § 3, 36 Stat. 263; see 
also United States v. Tsuji Suekichi, 199 F. 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1912). 
48. See Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 (1914); Ex parte Pouliot, 196 F. 437 (E.D. Wash. 1912). 
49. § 2, 34 Stat. 898. 
50. Id. Legislative history did not illuminate the meaning of the term “immoral purpose.” See 
Dubler, supra note 42, at 770–71. A House of Representatives Report explained only that this language 
was added “in order effectively to prohibit undesirable practices alleged to have grown up.” See id. at 
770 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 59-4558, at 19 (1906)). The Supreme Court later interpreted this term to 
exclude extramarital relations “short of concubinage.” Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559, 562 (1934). 
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the purposes of prostitution.51 However, absent from the Act was any mention of 
penalties for buyers of sex. 
Congress used the 1907 Act to expand the scope of the prostitution-related 
immigration laws “‘in order effectively to prohibit undesirable practices alleged to 
have grown up.’”52 Although the statute did not target any particular race, Congress 
intended to respond to continued concerns about Chinese women entering the 
United States for prostitution. The Commissioner-General’s Annual Immigration 
reports in the years prior to the 1907 Act insinuated that marriage was being used 
as a guise for bringing Chinese women into the United States for prostitution.53 
Case law also posits that concerns over the sexuality of noncitizen women  
was the primary motivator for the sexual conduct-related provisions in the 1907 
Act. The Supreme Court in United States v. Bitty, a case pertaining to the “immoral 
purpose” language in the 1907 Act, explained that “Congress, no doubt, proceeded 
on the ground that contact with society on the part of alien women [involved in 
prostitution] would be hurtful to the cause of sound private and public morality and 
to the general well-being of the people.”54 The Court specifically noted that 
prostitutes and concubines “must be held to lead an immoral life, if any regard 
whatever be had to the views that are almost universally held in this country as to 
the relations which may rightfully, from the standpoint of morality, exist between 
man and woman in the matter of sexual intercourse.”55 
The 1910 amendments to the 1907 Act reflected growing concerns over the 
corrupting influence of prostitution by noncitizen women. These amendments 
came in the wake of President Taft’s first annual message to Congress, which 
 
51. In addition to criminalizing the importation of any alien woman or girl for the purpose of 
prostitution, it criminalized the importation of any alien woman or girl “for any other immoral 
purpose.” § 3, 34 Stat. 898. It also criminalized “directly or indirectly” importing or attempting to import 
any such person. Id. It newly criminalized harboring any alien woman or girl for the purpose of 
prostitution or any other immoral purpose within three years of her entry into the United States. Id. 
52.  Dubler, supra note 42, at 770 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 59-4558, at 19 (1906)); see also  
H.R. REP. NO. 59-3021, at 19 (1906) (“Section 3. In this section it is attempted to extend the scope of 
the law, so far as it relates to the immigration of prostitutes, in order effectively to prohibit undesirable 
practices alleged to have grown up.”); H.R. REP. NO. 59-4558, at 2 (1906) (“Section 3: Strengthens the 
provisions with regard to the importation of prostitutes.”). 
53. See CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, 
AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 30 (1998) (citing TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION (1907); TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION (1906)); Stevens, supra note 33, at 291–92 (citing 
TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION 460 
(1901)). 
54. United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 401 (1908). This case showed some recognition of the 
role of men in illicit sexual intercourse, allowing for the prosecution of a man who “imported” a 
noncitizen woman for “an immoral purpose, namely [to] live with him as his concubine.” Id. at 399–
400 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55. Id. at 402. 
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expressed the need for additional legislation against the importation of prostitutes 
into the United States.56 
Retaining the prostitution-related exclusion grounds from the 1903 Act, the 
1910 amendments expanded existing deportation provisions to further control the 
conduct of noncitizens after entry into the United States.57 The amendments 
mandated the deportation of any noncitizen who at any time was “found an 
inmate . . . of a house of prostitution or practicing prostitution after such alien shall 
have entered the United States.”58 The amendments removed the temporal 
limitation of three years after entry from the 1907 Act, making the deportation 
provisions significantly harsher for noncitizens involved in prostitution as 
compared to other classes of noncitizens subject to deportation for conduct after 
entry.59 Other noncitizens, including perpetrators of violent crimes, were protected 
by time limits.60 
Although they made penalties harsher, the amendments removed some 
gendered language from the prostitution-related laws. Specifically, the amendments 
replaced the reference to women and girls as prostitutes from the deportation 
provisions with “[a]ny alien,”61 which was recommended by the Immigration 
Commission as a result of findings that males were also coming into the United 
 
56. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 16, at 146 (“[President Taft] mentioned immigration [in his 
first annual message] only in connection with the need for legislation against the importation of 
prostitutes.”). 
57. See Act of March 26, 1910 (An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act to Regulate the 
Immigration of Aliens into the United States”), ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 263. The amendments mandated 
deportation for a broader class of individuals involved in prostitution, including noncitizens who 
managed houses of prostitution, received any part of the earnings of a prostitute, and protected 
prostitutes from arrest. Id. § 3. Congress also targeted prostitution in the interior of the United States 
through the Mann Act, or White Slave Traffic Act in 1910, which prohibited the importation and 
interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 
Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 (2012)). Congress passed the Mann 
Act in direct response to growing hysteria that white women were being forced into prostitution and 
that prostitution by noncitizens was corrupting American morality. See GARDNER, supra note 35, at 51, 
60 (“[C]hanging conceptions of racial otherness and anxieties about the white American family 
intersected with long-held concerns over the moral conduct of immigrants to produce the ‘white 
slavery’ panic.”). See generally BRIAN DONOVAN, WHITE SLAVE CRUSADES: RACE, GENDER, AND 
ANTI-VICE ACTIVISM 1887–1917 (2006) (analyzing anti-vice campaigns to combat “white slavery” and 
their impact on racial hierarchy and categorization in the United States). 
58. § 3, 36 Stat. 263. 
59. See id. 
60. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United 
States), ch. 1134, §§ 20–21, 34 Stat. 898. 
61. Compare § 3, 36 Stat. 263, with § 3, 34 Stat. 898. 
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States for prostitution.62 However, references to women and girls remained in the 
exclusion provisions.63 
Legislative history continued to refer to prostitution using a morality-based 
framing. Prostitution was “an evil,”64 and the 1910 Amendments were touted as an 
“aid . . . in putting out this immoral fire that is now burning the very vitals out of 
society.”65 Immigration laws were increasingly used to target Japanese women, many 
of them coming to join their husbands in the United States. They were accused of 
misusing marriage to come to the United States for prostitution and accordingly 
were disproportionately barred from admission or deported as prostitutes around 
this time.66 Public rhetoric on Japanese women mirrored earlier language used to 
describe Chinese women—William Gates, secretary of the California State Board 
of Charities and Corrections, stated in 1907 in a national address that “the Japanese 
are but little better than the Chinese,” and that it was “safe to say that far more than 
a majority of these females were prostitutes.”67 
Legislative history shows recognition that women involved in prostitution 
could be victims, but there was no suggestion of relief or exceptions to penalties for 
such women. One representative described some women imported for prostitution 
as an “unfortunate class” and as “unwary and unsuspecting victim[s] . . . [who] 
 
62. See 45 CONG. REC. 518 (1910) (statement of Rep. Bennet) (“[F]or those reasons which will 
be noted by those who have read the Immigration Commission’s report, we drop the words ‘women 
and girls’ from the bill and make the law apply to all aliens who are imported for immoral purposes.”); 
U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES: A PARTIAL REPORT 
FROM THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION ON THE IMPORTATION AND HARBORING OF WOMEN FOR 
IMMORAL PURPOSES, S. DOC. NO. 61-196 at 35 (1909) (“Both from the investigations of the 
commission and those of the Bureau of Immigration, it is clear that there is a beginning, at any rate, of 
a traffic in boys and men for immoral purposes. . . . [O]ur laws should be so amended as to apply to all 
persons engaged in immoral practices.”). But see GARDNER, supra note 35, at 63 n.36 (discussing the 
lack of immigration investigations into male prostitution). 
63. See § 2, 36 Stat. 263. 
64. 45 CONG. REC. 519 (1910) (statement of Rep. Goebel). 
65. Id. at 547 (statement of Rep. Cox). 
66. See GARDNER, supra note 35, at 38–45 & n.18. Some Japanese women were coming to  
the United States as “picture” brides, marrying via proxy marriage Japanese men living in the United 
States. See COTT, supra note 25, at 151–55 (describing the “picture bride” marriage practice and the 
immigration response by the United States government). The Dillingham Commission, see infra note 70 
and accompanying text, expressed concerns about the legitimacy of Japanese wives coming to join their 
husbands, stating that “a large majority of women coming in this way are intended for the purposes of 
prostitution.” U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, 61ST CONG., IMPORTATION AND HARBORING OF 
WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, vol. 19, at 69 (1911) (presented by Mr. Dillingham); see also HARRY 
A. MILLIS, THE JAPANESE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INVESTIGATION FOR THE 
COMMISSION ON RELATIONS WITH JAPAN APPOINTED BY THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE 
CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA 234 (1915) (“Until recently advantage was taken of the admission 
of ‘picture brides’ to bring into this country women to be used for immoral purposes.”). 
67. GARDNER, supra note 35, at 57 (quoting W. Almont Gates, Oriental Immigration on the 
Pacific Coast: An Address Delivered at the National Conference of Charities and Correction at Buffalo, 
( June 10, 1909)); see also SIDNEY LEWIS GULICK, THE AMERICAN JAPANESE PROBLEM: A STUDY OF 
THE RACIAL RELATIONS OF THE EAST AND THE WEST 15 (1914) (“Japanese are also charged with lack 
of all ideas of sex morality . . . . Japanese women are so subservient that they easily become 
prostitutes.”). 
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become[ ] the property of some debauchee or inhuman monster” upon arrival in 
the United States.68 However, he incongruously promoted a “statute strong and 
powerful enough to enable the Government to deport persons who, by fraud or 
otherwise, enter the ports of the United States for the purposes of prostitution.”69 
A report by the Dillingham Commission, created by the 1907 Act to investigate 
immigration,70 found that some women were forced into prostitution. However, it 
too recommended heightened screening at ports of entry for deportation and other 
penalties.71 The report also recommended removal of the three-year limitation after 
entry on deportation of sellers of sex, which Congress adopted in the 1910 
amendments.72 Blame for prostitution was still being leveled at female sellers of sex 
regardless of whether their participation was volitional, due to a singular focus on 
the perceived moral harm of prostitution. 
D. Immigration Act of 1917 
The comprehensive Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 modified the Act of 
1907 as amended in 1910.73 The 1917 Act “was designed primarily to exclude aliens 
with physical, mental, or moral disqualifications . . . .”74 The legislative history 
continued to reflect a consensus that noncitizens coming to the United States for 
prostitution were among the most undesirable immigrants.75 Prostitutes thus 
remained an excludable class within the 1917 Act, but the earlier references to 
women and girls in the exclusion provisions were removed to allow the immigration 
laws to capture men.76 
The 1917 Act provided additional immigration penalties for prostitution 
which were inapplicable to noncitizens who committed other crimes, including 
 
68. 45 CONG. REC. 547 (1910) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
69. Id. But see 45 CONG. REC. 548 (1910) (statement of Rep. Mann) (“[U]nder the provision if 
an alien woman comes here innocent and young and an American citizen debauches her, she is to be 
sent abroad on the world, although the fault is laid at our door; . . . [s]educed by an American citizen, 
led by an American citizen into prostitution, she would be sent out of the country by this enlightened 
country.”). 
70. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United 
States), ch. 1134, § 39, 34 Stat. 898 (creating Dillingham Commission for study of immigration). 
71. U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, REPORT ON THE IMPORTATION AND HARBORING OF 
WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, S. DOC. No. 61-196, at 36–38 (1909). 
72. Id. at 37. 
73. Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874. 
74. S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 66 (1950). 
75. See 52 CONG. REC. 348 (1914) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“Against the exclusion of that class 
of people [including prostitutes] there is not now and has not been a single word of protest upon the 
floor of the Senate.”); see also id. (describing prostitutes as in a class of noncitizens who are “evilly 
disposed, . . . vicious, . . . [and] wicked.”). 
76. See S. REP. NO. 63-355, at 4 (1914) (explaining that the purpose of the substitution of 
“persons” for “women and girls” in the “immorality” exclusion grounds was “to include males as well 
as females in the class”). Compare § 3, 39 Stat. 874, with White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 2, 
36 Stat. 263 (1910). The classes of excludable aliens enumerated in the 1917 Act remained in effect until 
1952. See S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 335 (1950) (“The excludable classes were assembled in the act of 
February 5, 1917, which is presently in effect” (citation omitted).). 
First to Printer_Dadhania (Do Not Delete) 10/2/2018  1:40 PM 
2018] DEPORTING UNDESIRABLE WOMEN 67 
violent crimes, showing Congress still considered prostitution to be one of the most 
serious crimes for immigration purposes.77 First, this Act marked as deportable any 
noncitizen who had previously been excluded or deported as a prostitute or 
procurer or for participating in any activity related to the business of prostitution or 
importation for prostitution.78 Second, it disallowed relief from exclusion or 
deportation for “a female of the sexually immoral classes” by denying such a woman 
citizenship if she married a United States citizen after her arrest or her commission 
of acts that would subject her to exclusion or deportation.79 Third, the 1917 Act 
added criminal penalties for noncitizens who returned or attempted to return to the 
United States after they had been excluded or deported under the Act’s provisions 
“which relate to prostitutes, procurers, or other like immoral persons.”80 Other 
criminal activity was not subject to this harsher treatment.81 
Between 1917 and 1952, there were only a few changes to the statutory scheme 
pertaining to prostitution. These changes continued the trend of imposing 
additional immigration penalties on noncitizens involved in prostitution by making 
them ineligible for certain forms of immigration relief.82 
E. Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act) (1952) 
The next major legislation after the 1917 Act was the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, which continues 
to provide the framework for current immigration laws.83 This Act made several 
 
77. § 19, 39 Stat. 874; see also supra text accompanying notes 59–60. The 1917 Act also made 
harsher the penalties for crimes involving moral turpitude, providing for the first time for the 
deportation of noncitizens who committed crimes involving moral turpitude. See § 19, 39 Stat. 874;  
S. REP. NO. 352 (1916). 
78. § 19, 39 Stat. 874. 
79. Id. At this time, women who were not subject to the racial bars to naturalization 
automatically received citizenship upon marriage to a United States citizen. See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, 
ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604, 604; see also Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and 
the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 419–39 (2005) (discussing the 1855 
Act and subsequent laws on citizenship via marriage). There was some objection to an earlier version 
of the provision, which more broadly prevented a “female of the sexually immoral” classes from 
obtaining citizenship upon marriage to a United States citizen. See 53 CONG. REC. 5173 (1916) 
(statement of Rep. Bennet) (“[I]t seems to me that the provision ought to be stricken out. . . . You are 
putting under the chance of blackmail every alien woman who hereafter marries an American citizen, 
although she may be chaste as the driven snow, because any [person] who has a grudge or prejudice, or 
simply desires money . . . can cast a doubt on [her] citizenship . . . .”). 
80. § 4, 39 Stat. 874. The 1917 Act provided for a term of imprisonment of not more than two 
years. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. See Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, Pub. L. 68-139, § 214, 43 Stat. 153 (precluding 
prostitutes, among others, from voluntary departure, which allows certain noncitizens in removal 
proceedings to leave the United States without the entry of a final order of removal); Alien Registration 
Act, § 20, Pub. L. 76-670, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 670–71 (1940) (precluding prostitutes, among others, 
from suspension of deportation, which allowed immigration officials to exercise discretion to suspend 
the deportation of certain noncitizens who were otherwise deportable). 
83. Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. 82-414, ch. 477, 66  
Stat. 163 (1952). This Act superseded the 1917 Act. See id. 
First to Printer_Dadhania (Do Not Delete) 10/2/2018  1:40 PM 
68 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:53 
changes to the prostitution-related provisions but retained some of the language 
from prior legislation.84 
The McCarran-Walter Act expanded penalties for prostitution-related 
activities in several ways. First, the Act expanded the classes of noncitizens who are 
ineligible to receive visas and who are excluded from admission to include those 
who “have engaged in prostitution, or aliens coming to the United States solely, 
principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution.”85 This Act newly barred 
noncitizens who had engaged in prostitution in the past, whereas prior legislation 
focused on present conduct through its exclusion of “prostitutes.” The Act further 
broadened the scope of the prostitution exclusion provision by encompassing any 
noncitizen who has engaged in prostitution as well as any noncitizen coming to the 
United States to engage in the practice whether or not it be the noncitizen’s principal 
purpose of entry, no longer requiring a noncitizen to be a “prostitute.”86 It also 
precluded an additional class of noncitizens in a catchall provision for “[a]liens 
coming to the United States to engage in any immoral sexual act.”87 
Second, the McCarran-Walter Act widened the scope of the deportability 
grounds related to prostitution, encompassing past actions related to prostitution as 
well as prostitution after entry. Whereas prior legislation had made deportable “any 
alien who shall be found an inmate . . . of a house of prostitution,” the McCarran-
Walter Act made deportable any noncitizen who became a member of the 
prostitution-related exclusion class, in other words any noncitizen who “is a 
prostitute, has engaged in prostitution, or is coming to the United States to solely, 
principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution.”88 Despite the expansion of 
 
84. See In re R-M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 392, 395 (BIA 1957) (noting that the 1952 version of the 
procurement-related law “is exactly the same as the provision in the parallel statute of preexisting law, 
namely, section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, except that the first word ‘persons’ was 
changed to ‘aliens’”). 
85. § 212(a), 66 Stat. 163, 182–87. 
86. See infra notes 100–101 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of deporting a 
noncitizen woman as a “prostitute”). This language specifying that prostitution could be an ancillary 
reason for entry was included to overcome the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansen v. Haff, 291  
U.S. 559, 562 (1934), which required that an “immoral purpose” be the purpose of a noncitizen’s entry 
for the provision to apply. See S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 357–58 (1950) (recommending that “excludable 
class should include persons who seek to enter the United States to engage in any illicit sexual act or 
other immoral act, whether that purpose be the sole, principal, or incidental purpose of their entry . . . 
[to] overcome the decision of the Supreme Court in Hansen v. Haff ”). 
87. § 212(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 183. The McCarran-Walter Act failed to include language about 
noncitizens coming “solely, principally, or incidentally” to engage in illicit behavior in § 212(a)(13). See 
id. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s holding in Hansen v. Haff, see supra note 86, continued to apply to 
this subsection. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR 
EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 115–16 (Comm. Print 1988) (describing how § 212(a)(13) failed to 
overcome the holding of Hansen (citing In re B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 1953)). 
88. Compare White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 3, 36 Stat. 263 (1910), with § 241(a)(12), 
66 Stat. 163, 207 (citing § 212(a)(12), 66 Stat. 163, 182–83). This section of the McCarran-Walter Act 
also encompassed procurers, noncitizens who have received the proceeds of prostitution, and 
noncitizens connected with the management of a house of prostitution. See § 241(a)(12), 66 Stat. 163, 
207 (citing § 212(a)(12), 66 Stat. 163, 182–83); infra text accompanying notes 132–134. 
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penalties for prostitution-related activities, the McCarran-Walter Act also 
harmonized some immigration penalties for prostitution and other activities 
deemed by Congress to be undesirable.89 
In addition to changing the scope of the prostitution-related immigration 
provisions, the McCarran-Walter Act also removed the last reference to gender in 
these provisions.90 It eliminated the provision that prevented “a female of the 
sexually immoral classes” from receiving citizenship if she married a United States 
citizen after her arrest.91 Despite this change, legislators and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) continued to refer to sellers of sex as only women until 
relatively recently.92  
The legislative history of the McCarran-Walter Act reveals that Congress for 
the most part did not reexamine whether prostitution continued to warrant severe 
immigration penalties and whether it continued to be viewed as a serious threat to 
United States society. Rather, the legislative history shows that prostitution was 
assumed to be a serious crime. The Senate Special Subcommittee to Investigate 
Immigration and Naturalization recommended without significant explanation the 
expansion of the exclusion grounds to include noncitizens who had previously 
engaged in prostitution.93 Senator Lehman, when criticizing the harshness of other 
portions of the McCarran-Walter Act, drew the line at noncitizens involved in 
prostitution, stating that “[w]e certainly should not permit the entry of subversives, 
criminals, prostitutes, pimps, and persons of that character.”94 Congress continued 
to lump prostitution, criminal activities, and subversive activities together as 
 
89. See § 242(e), 66 Stat. 163, 211 (criminalizing the failure to depart or hampering the 
deportation process after a final order of removal for a broader class of noncitizens than those specified 
in the 1917 Act); H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 185–86 (1952); see also § 276, 66 Stat. 163 (providing 
penalties for reentry for any noncitizen who was excluded or deported); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 220 
(1952). The Act also specifically enumerated for the first time a list of conduct that precluded a 
noncitizen from establishing good moral character. Such conduct included a noncitizen who is a 
prostitute, has engaged in prostitution, or is coming to the United States to solely, principally, or 
incidentally to engage in prostitution. § 101(f)(3), 66 Stat. 163, 172. 
90. See 66 Stat. 163. 
91. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., In re R-M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 392, 395 (BIA 1957) (“It is well established that the term 
‘prostitute’ relates solely to a person of the female sex.”); infra note 117 (providing quotes where 
legislators referred to trafficked sellers of sex as women). The BIA is the administrative appellate body 
within the Executive Office of Immigration Review in the Department of Justice. 
93. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 358 (1950) (“It is the recommendation of the  
subcommittee . . . that the excludable classes of immoral aliens should be enlarged to include persons 
who have practiced prostitution . . . , as well as those who are so engaged at the time of entry as provided 
in the law at present.”); see also 22 C.F.R. § 40.7(a)(12)(ii) (2003); 52 Fed. Reg. 42594 (Nov. 5, 1987) 
(“The fact that an alien may have ceased to engage in prostitution shall not serve to remove the existing 
ground of ineligibility under INA 212(a)(12).”). 
94. See, e.g., 98 CONG. REC. 5113, 5115 (1952) (statement of Sen. Lehman) (“[D]eportation is a 
harsh penalty, as harsh as any there can be. Yet under the McCarran bill, deportation is required not 
only for dope addicts, pimps, prostitutes, hardened criminals, and true subversives, but also for those 
who have misrepresented a material fact in a visa application or who arrived . . . at a place other than 
the one duly provided by regulation.”). 
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analogous conduct, and noncitizens engaging in such conduct continued to be 
viewed as “undesirable[ ].”95 
Even where legislative history recognized that prostitution may not be a 
serious concern, it nevertheless recommended an expansion of morality-based 
immigration penalties. One Senate Subcommittee Report noted that “these 
excludable classes [immoral aliens] no longer present a serious problem . . . .”96 
However, it went on to recommend that such noncitizens still be excluded because 
“should they [the exclusion grounds] be eliminated[,] the problem would again 
become as large as it was in the latter half of the last century.”97 A Senate Report 
recommended enlarging “the excludable classes of immoral aliens . . . to include 
persons who have practiced prostitution” and who “seek to enter the United States 
to engage in any illicit sexual act or other immoral act, whether that purpose be the 
sole, principal, or incidental purpose of their entry.”98 This suggestion ultimately 
was adopted in the McCarran-Walter Act.99 
The Senate Report also recommended broadening the scope of the 
immigration laws to “include a comprehensive classification of immoral aliens 
deemed to be undesirable [that] should be broad enough to include all aliens who 
engage in sexual relations for hire regardless of whether they have other means of 
support or other employment.”100 This recommendation came in response to the 
concerns of an unnamed immigration official that a noncitizen woman who engages 
in sexual activity for compensation “is not a prostitute as long as she has some other 
vocation or work which she follows along with her practicing of prostitution, and 
[that] it has been almost impossible within the past few years in this area to make a 
[deportation] case on an alien prostitute . . . .”101 Despite this focus on making the 
prostitution-related provisions harsher for sellers of sex, the legislative history again 
did not consider the role of buyers in prostitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95. See 98 CONG. REC. 5090 (1952) (statement of Sen. McCarran) (“Senate bill 2550 also revises 
those provisions of the law relating to the qualitative grounds for the exclusion of aliens, so that the 
criminal and immoral classes, the subversives and other undesirables can be excluded from admission 
to the United States.”). 
96. S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 358 (1950). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. See supra notes 84–87. 
100. S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 393 (1950). 
101. Id. at 392; see also id. at 871 (providing a table of aliens excluded from the United States in 
fiscal years 1940–1949, showing the number of excluded “[p]rostitutes or aliens coming for any 
immoral purpose” as 24 in 1940, 7 in 1944, and 3 in 1948). 
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F. Immigration Act of 1990 and Victims of Trafficking Violence and Protection  
Act (2000) 
The changes in the prostitution-related immigration laws since 1952 mark the 
beginning of Congress’s recognition that forced prostitution may warrant relief for 
victims in certain cases, and also that prostitution may not be as serious a crime as 
previously understood. 
In 1957, Congress created a discretionary waiver of excludability for 
prostitution that was available to certain close relatives of United States citizens and 
lawful permanent residents.102 The purpose of this waiver was “to prevent the 
separation of families”103 due to the prior “inflexibility” of the 1952 exclusion 
ground that encompassed past acts of prostitution.104 
The Immigration Act of 1990 made the next most significant changes to the 
immigration laws related to prostitution. First, it limited the application of the 
prostitution-related inadmissibility ground to noncitizens who had engaged in 
prostitution within ten years, whereas there was no such time limitation in the 
McCarran-Walter Act.105 Prior to the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, 
the staff to the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy had 
recommended the bar for noncitizens who had engaged in past prostitution be 
completely removed, finding that “[t]he past practice of prostitution presents no 
threat to U.S. society.”106 Although Congress ultimately did not adopt this 
recommendation, it created a ten-year temporal limitation, showing a recognition 
that past prostitution was not in all cases detrimental to the United States despite 
some statements in the legislative history against loosening restrictions on 
prostitution.107 In support of this provision, the legislative history shows an 
 
102. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639; see also Act of Sept. 26, 1961,  
Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 655 (incorporating permanent waiver provision); Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 919 (recodifying waiver provision as section 212(h) of the INA). The 
waiver was available at the discretion of the Attorney General to spouses, children, and parents of 
United States citizens and lawful permanent residents if the noncitizen’s exclusion would result in 
extreme hardship to the qualifying relative and the noncitizen’s admission would not be contrary to the 
national welfare, safety, or security of the United States. See 79 Stat. 911, 919; see also 22 C.F.R. § 
40.7(a)(9)(iv) (2003); 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(a) (1988); 52 Fed. Reg. 42,593 (1987). 
103. SEN. REP. NO. 85-1057, at 5 (1957). 
104. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF 
ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
ANALYSIS 115 (Comm. Print 1988). 
105. Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5077. 
106. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF 
ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
ANALYSIS 116 (Comm. Print 1988) (quoting U.S. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE 
POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: STAFF REPORT 757 (1981)). 
107. See, e.g., Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 50, 56 (1987) (statement of  
Mr. Nelson, Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner) (“[I ]t is not clear to us that repeal 
of the ground of excludability and deportability relating to prostitution is warranted. In practical terms, 
no desirable objective is served by the admission of persons who have engaged in or who might engage 
in such activity.”); H.R. REP. NO. 100-882, at 56 (1988) (“In the view of the Department [of Justice], 
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awareness that women involved in prostitution could be victims of circumstances, 
even if they were not trafficked or forced by third parties. For example, one 
representative contemplated this ten-year limitation to benefit “young girls, young 
women who may have been forced by [war], stuck with younger siblings to support, 
who turned to prostitution as a result of these kinds of conditions.”108 
Second, the Immigration Act of 1990 removed prostitution as an enumerated 
ground of deportability, despite some objection.109 At the same time, however, 
Congress added a ground making deportable “[a]ny alien who at the time of entry 
or adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable 
by the law existing at such time . . . .”110 The effect of this provision was to trigger 
deportability for noncitizens who had engaged in prostitution within ten years of 
their dates of entry or adjustment of status. Despite this addition, the 1990 Act 
removed the McCarran-Walter Act’s broad language allowing for the deportation 
of any alien who is a prostitute, has engaged in prostitution at any time, or is coming 
to the United States to engage in prostitution.111 
Finally, this Act eliminated the exclusion from entry of “[a]liens coming to the 
United States to engage in any immoral sexual act.”112 The BIA speculated from the 
“scant legislative history of the repeal of [this] section” that this language was 
 
this change [elimination of the prostitution-related ground of exclusion] . . . would not be in the  
national interest. Such activity is frequently associated with violent and other serious crimes.”); 132 
CONG. REC. 27009, 27011 (1986) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“I do not think it is good policy 
that we ought to open the door to the prostitutes . . . of this world even with a 10-year statute of 
limitations . . . . I am not for the procurers and prostitutes of this world . . . to have unlimited access  
to our country.”). Even a supporter of the ten-year limitation categorized sellers of sex as 
“undesirables.” 132 CONG. REC. 27009, 27011–12 (statement of Rep. Frank) (stating he is “generally 
opposed to the procurers and prostitutes of this world” and that “we are not talking about any automatic 
entry of undesirables”). 
108. 132 CONG. REC. 27009, 27011 (1986) (statement of Rep. Frank). 
109. § 602, 104 Stat. at 5077. There was only limited discussion on the elimination of this 
deportability ground in the legislative history. See Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 50, 
52 (1987) (statement of John Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice) (“[W]e object 
to the elimination of section 241(a)(12), which deals with the deportation of aliens engaged in 
prostitution . . . .”); supra note 107 (providing statement of Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Commissioner Nelson criticizing repeal of prostitution-related deportability provision). The 
Immigration Act of 1990 replaced the previous grounds of deportability related to crime, including the 
prostitution-related grounds, with four categories of crimes: crimes involving moral turpitude, 
controlled substances, certain firearm offenses, and miscellaneous crimes including sabotage, treason, 
and Military Selective Service Act violations. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-882, at 41 (1988) (“The four 
grounds in this category [criminal offenses] replace 241(a)(4), (11), (12), (14), and (17), which relate to 
crimes of moral turpitude; drug violations; prostitution; firearms violations; and treason, trading with 
the enemy and related crimes.”). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(A), with Immigration and Nationality 
Act (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. 414, ch. 477, § 241(a), 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(A). A similar provision remains in effect today. See infra note 123 and 
accompanying text. 
111. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
112. See 104 Stat. 4978. 
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removed because it “was deemed either obsolete or duplicative of other language in 
the criminal and related exclusion category.”113 
Another significant step towards the recognition that noncitizens involved in 
prostitution may need protection was in 2000 when Congress passed the Victims of 
Trafficking Violence and Protection Act (VTVPA).114 This law was passed in the 
wake of increased awareness of and frenzy over human trafficking, particularly sex 
trafficking.115 The VTVPA was multi-faceted legislation targeting human 
trafficking. It created T and U nonimmigrant statuses for victims of severe forms 
of human trafficking to allow them to remain in the United States to assist in law 
enforcement efforts against their traffickers and for victims of serious crimes 
including human trafficking, respectively.116 The legislative history is replete with 
references to women forced into prostitution as victims deserving of protection.117 
Although prior legislative history also recognized the potential for victimization, 
Congress in this legislation provided for the first time immigration relief for victims 
of trafficking through T and U nonimmigrant statuses.118 
Aside from this limited relief, the prostitution-related immigration laws have 
not changed significantly since their inception in 1875—although they have become 
increasingly harsh, their basic substance and justifications remain the same. 
Throughout their development, the laws have focused on sellers of sex as bad 
 
113. In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *4 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014). 
114. Victims of Trafficking Violence and Protection Act (VTVPA), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101–7114 (2000)). 
115. See Erin O’Brien & Belinda Carpenter, Antiprostitution Agendas and the Creation of  
U.S. Antitrafficking Policy, in CHALLENGING PERSPECTIVES ON STREET-BASED SEX WORK 257 
(Katie Hail-Jares et al. eds., 2017). This law was lauded in the legislative history as “a solidly crafted 
piece of legislation that addresses an urgent moral and humanitarian problem.” 146 CONG. REC. 7291 
(2000) (statement of Rep. Gilman). One of the main criticisms of the law was that segments of the 
United States government were conflating voluntary sex work and human trafficking. See, e.g., ALISON 
BASS, GETTING SCREWED: SEX WORKERS AND THE LAW 88–92 (2015). 
116. 22 U.S.C. § 7101; see also infra notes 173–174. 
117. See, e.g., Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l 
Operations and Human Rights, 106th Cong. 1, 3 (1999) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“Current law  
and law enforcement strategies . . . often punish the victims more severely than they punish  
the perpetrators. When a sex-for-hire establishment is raided, the women . . . are typically  
deported . . . without reference to whether their participation was voluntary or involuntary.”); The Sex 
Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United States, Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., 106th Cong. 3, 33, 35 (1999) (statement of Rep. Smith, Chairman, 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) (“[W]e will finally treat the victims—those 
women who have been exploited by the traffickers—for that which they are: they are victims. We  
will provide some safe haven for them, but we will also provide humanitarian assistance . . . .”); 146 
CONG. REC. H2684 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Gejdenson) (“These are clearly some of 
the most vulnerable people on the planet: people who are impoverished, often; people who have not 
had the opportunities to defend themselves.”); id. at 7293 (statement of Rep. Pitts) (retelling the story 
of a sex trafficking victim who was ultimately deported to Mexico, and stating “if this country stands 
for justice at all, we can do better for this girl”); see also id. at H2683–86 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) 
(recounting stories of young women and girls who were forced into sex trafficking). Some of this 
language, describing victims as unwitting and helpless, is reminiscent of the language used in the early 
twentieth century during the White Slave Panic. See supra note 57. 
118. See infra notes 173–174 and accompanying text. 
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actors. As the next Part describes, current prostitution-related immigration laws 
continue to single out sellers of sex. 
II. CURRENT PROSTITUTION-RELATED IMMIGRATION LAWS 
Under current immigration law, prostitution-related activities can trigger 
several immigration penalties. There are three main provisions in the immigration 
laws that encompass prostitution-related activities: an inadmissibility ground 
specifically for prostitution and related activities, an inadmissibility ground for 
crimes involving moral turpitude, and a deportability ground for crimes involving 
moral turpitude.119 Under the inadmissibility grounds, a noncitizen can be denied 
admission into the United States, either through the denial of a visa or entry at the 
United States border.120 A noncitizen is subject to the inadmissibility grounds even 
after a lawful entry into the United States when he or she applies to adjust status to 
become a lawful permanent resident.121 The deportability grounds trigger removal 
for noncitizens who have been lawfully admitted to the United States, including 
lawful permanent residents.122 In addition to these three provisions, an ancillary 
ground of deportability encompasses the prostitution-related inadmissibility 
ground, triggering deportation if a noncitizen was inadmissible at the time of entry 
or adjustment of status.123 
Other provisions cross-reference these inadmissibility and deportability 
provisions to trigger additional immigration penalties. For example, these grounds 
can subject a noncitizen to mandatory detention during the pendency of removal 
proceedings.124 A noncitizen who is captured by the inadmissibility grounds may be 
unable to establish good moral character, which can preclude a noncitizen from 
several immigration benefits including naturalization, cancellation of removal for 
nonpermanent residents, and voluntary departure requested at the conclusion of 
removal proceedings.125 
 
119. INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (2012); INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
120. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
121. INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (making deportable any noncitizen who is 
inadmissible at the time of adjustment of status). 
122. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
123. INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A); see also supra notes 110–114 and 
accompanying text. 
124. INA § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). 
125. INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (listing persons who are not of “good moral 
character,” which includes anyone who falls under the prostitution-related and crimes involving moral 
turpitude inadmissibility grounds); INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1247(a) (stating that a naturalization 
applicant must establish good moral character for the five years preceding the date of the application); 
INA § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) (stating that a noncitizen who applies for cancellation 
of removal must have been of “good moral character” for the ten years immediately preceding the date 
of the application); INA § 240(B)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (stating that the noncitizen requesting 
voluntary departure must show good moral character for at least five years preceding the date of service 
of the Notice to Appear). The inadmissibility ground also can negatively affect eligibility for cancellation 
of removal. See INA § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (codifying the stop-time rule, whereby a period 
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This Part analyzes current immigration laws related to prostitution and shows 
that these laws continue to target sellers of sex or have targeted sellers of sex until 
relatively recently. This Part also shows that immigration laws are slowly starting to 
recognize the potential for victimization in immigration law, as well as the fact that 
prostitution is a low-level crime. 
A. Prostitution and Commercialized Vice Inadmissibility Ground 
The prostitution-related inadmissibility ground specifically references 
prostitution and procurement of prostitution but does not encompass buyers of 
sex.126 First, this inadmissibility ground targets noncitizens who are coming to the 
United States “to engage in prostitution” or who have “engaged in prostitution 
within 10 years of the date of application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of 
status.”127 Although a conviction can be evidence of prostitution, it is not required 
for a finding of inadmissibility—a noncitizen need only admit to facts that show 
she falls under this ground.128 However, the BIA has held that offering to commit 
 
of continuous residence terminates when a noncitizen has committed an offense in section 212(a)(2) of 
the INA, which includes prostitution and crimes involving moral turpitude). 
126. This inadmissibility ground also includes a catch-all for any noncitizen who “is coming to 
the United States to engage in any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether or not related to 
prostitution.” INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(iii). “Unlawful commercialized vice” 
may include prostitution, gambling, illegal sales of alcohol, and narcotics addiction. See, e.g., id.; United 
States v. Iqbal, 684 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining that DHS had initiated removal 
proceedings against the noncitizen defendant, charging that he had come to the United States to engage 
in unlawful commercialized vice through his brother’s illegal gambling enterprise); In re A-, 6 I. &  
N. Dec. 540, 553 (BIA 1955) (explaining that the noncitizen was charged with participation in unlawful 
commercialized vice, namely the illegal sale of liquor and gambling activities, but the charge was not 
sustained because the record did not establish he came to the United States to engage in the unlawful 
commercialized vice); In re B-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 98, 111 (BIA 1954) (citing addiction to narcotics as an 
example of commercialized vice). No published decision has extended unlawful commercialized vice 
to include buying sex. 
127. INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(i). Prostitution is defined as “engaging in 
promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire.” 22 C.F.R. § 40.24(b) (2018); see also In re Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 549, 553 (BIA 2008) (applying this definition of prostitution to interpret section 
212(a)(2)(D) of the INA). But see In re Ding, 27 I. & N. Dec. 295 (BIA 2018) (holding that “prostitution” 
in the context of aggravated felonies in section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the INA is “not limited to offenses 
involving sexual intercourse,” and defining it as “engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in, 
sexual conduct for anything of value”). Offenses related to managing a prostitution business, 
transportation for the purposes of prostitution, and trafficking are aggravated felonies, but simple 
prostitution is not. INA § 101(a)(43)(K), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K). Additionally, the definition of 
prostitution for the purpose of the inadmissibility ground requires “elements of continuity and 
regularity”—a single act of prostitution is generally not sufficient. See 22 C.F.R. § 40.24(b); see also In 
re T-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 1955) (“[T]o constitute ‘engaging in’ there must be substantial, 
continuous and regular, as distinguished from casual, single or isolated, acts.”). However, the BIA has 
interpreted “prostitution” in section 212(a)(2)(D) of the INA to allow a single conviction for 
prostitution to trigger inadmissibility, contrary to the regulations. In re Arcos-Valencia, 2005 WL 
952477, at *1 (BIA Apr. 13, 2005) (per curiam) (concluding the noncitizen was inadmissible due to one 
conviction for engaging in prostitution). 
128. See INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D). 
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prostitution is insufficient.129 Notably, there is no statutory exception to this ground 
for forced prostitution. But to protect victims of forced prostitution, the BIA has 
read a limited duress exception into this ground.130 The duress exception may be 
limited to noncitizens who have not been convicted, resting on the faulty 
assumption that if a noncitizen was convicted, any duress defense must have 
failed.131 
Second, the prostitution-related inadmissibility grounds capture procurers of 
prostitution but fail to encompass buyers.132 The BIA interpreted the term procurer 
to mean “a person who receives money to obtain a prostitute for another person.”133 
The BIA specifically held the term does not include “someone who solicits another 
to engage in prostitution for himself.”134 
B. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude—Inadmissibility and Deportability Grounds 
In addition to the prostitution-related inadmissibility ground, the crimes 
involving moral turpitude inadmissibility and deportability grounds also encompass 
prostitution-related activities. Like the prostitution-related inadmissibility ground, 
crimes involving moral turpitude jurisprudence reveals a troubling targeting of 
sellers of sex, generally women—prostitution has long been recognized by courts 
as a crime involving moral turpitude, but solicitation, offering to purchase or 
 
129. In re Kum Cha Carter, 2007 WL 3318661, at *1 (BIA Sept. 14, 2007) (“[I]t is doubtful that 
a conviction . . . of offering to commit prostitution satisfies a deportation charge that the respondent 
engaged in prostitution” (quoting In re M-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 300, 301 (BIA 1954).). 
130. See In re M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 251, 252 (BIA 1956); see also Kerry Q. Battenfeld, Note, Moral 
Crimes Post-Mellouli: Making a Case for Eliminating State-Based Prostitution Convictions as a Basis for 
Inadmissibility in Immigration Proceedings, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 619, 622–25 (2017). 
131. See In re Applicant, 2009 WL 1742009, at *2 (AAO Jan. 16, 2009) (concluding that the 
duress exception created by In re M- was not available where the applicant was convicted of 
prostitution); Battenfeld, supra note 130, at 624–25; infra note 222 (discussing the recognition that 
prostitution-related criminal laws capture individuals who are forced to sell sex). 
132. See INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D). Specifically, this ground includes “any 
noncitizen who directly or indirectly procures or attempts to procure, or (within 10 years of the date of 
application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status) procured or attempted to procure or to 
import, prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution, or receives or (within such 10-year 
period) received, in whole or in part, the proceeds of prostitution.” Id. 
133. In re Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 24 I. & N. Dec. 549, 552 (BIA 2008) (emphasis added). The 
BIA reasoned that “Congress appears to have been primarily concerned with excluding and removing 
aliens who were involved in the business of prostitution . . . .” Id. 
134. Id. (emphasis added). However, the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), the appellate 
body of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) within the Department of Homeland 
Security, concluded that a noncitizen was inadmissible under this ground for offering or agreeing to pay 
a fee to engage in sexual conduct. The AAO did not analyze the meaning of “procurer,” instead 
assuming that it applied in that situation. See In re Applicant, 2004 WL 2897081, at *2 (AAO Apr. 16, 
2004) (concluding that the applicant, who was convicted of offering or agreeing to pay a fee to engage 
in sexual conduct, “was convicted of prostitution” under section 212(a)(2)(D) of the INA). This 
decision is non-precedential and is not legally binding on the Department of Homeland Security, which 
adjudicates some immigration applications, or on the BIA. 
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purchasing sex, which is frequently done by men, was only more recently held to 
involve moral turpitude.135 
The crimes involving moral turpitude inadmissibility ground provides that any 
noncitizen convicted of or who admits having committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude is inadmissible.136 The deportability ground states that “[a]ny alien who . . . 
is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 
10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status . . .) after 
the date of admission . . . is deportable” if the crime is one where a sentence of one 
year or longer may be imposed.137 Additionally, the INA makes deportable any 
noncitizen who is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude at any 
time after admission.138 
The term “crime involving moral turpitude” first appeared in immigration law 
in 1891, prohibiting the admission of noncitizens “who have been convicted of a 
felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude . . . .”139 
The term was used “to separate the desirable from the undesirable immigrants, and 
to permit only those to land on our shores who have certain physical and moral 
qualities.”140 Since 1891, it has continued to be present in United States immigration 
law.141 
“Crime involving moral turpitude” has not been defined in legislation or 
legislative history.142 The BIA has interpreted the term “moral turpitude” to mean 
“conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or 
depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and 
 
135. See BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND 
THE AMERICAN REFORM TRADITION 3–4 (1990) (“[W]e see a prostitution economy that expresses 
social and sexual inequalities within society—women are overwhelmingly the sellers of sex and men the 
buyers.”); Maddy Coy, Introduction to PROSTITUTION, HARM AND GENDER INEQUALITY: THEORY, 
RESEARCH AND POLICY 5 (Maddy Coy ed., 2012) (“[P]rostitution disproportionately involves men 
buying access to women’s bodies.”); Donna M. Vandiver & Jessie L. Krienert, An Assessment of a Cross-
National Sample of Men and Women Arrested for Prostitution, 4 SW. J. CRIM. JUST. 89, 90, 96 (2007) 
(finding that in 2001, 2,637 females and 1,382 males were arrested for prostitution according to the 
National Incident-Based Reporting System). 
 The term “solicitation” can refer to “an offer to pay or accept money in exchange for sex.” 
Solicitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). To avoid confusion, this Article will use 
“solicitation” only when referring to an offer to purchase sex or to the purchase of sex. 
136. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
137. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
138. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
139. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 
140. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
115 (2007) (quoting Special Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., Rep. (ii) 
(1891) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
141. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1952); INA § 237(a)(2)(A), 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A); Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 898–99; Act of Mar. 3, 1903, 
ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 350 (1950). 
142. See Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 10 (Comm. Print. 1988)). 
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man, either one’s fellow man or society in general.”143 The BIA has explained that 
whether a crime involves moral turpitude should be judged by standards “prevailing 
in the United States as a whole, regarding the common view of our people 
concerning its moral character.”144 Courts have also held that the conduct must be 
committed with scienter.145 As a general rule, if the conduct in question is malum in 
se or inherently wrong, as compared with an act that is malum prohibitum or conduct 
that is only statutorily prohibited, it involves moral turpitude.146 
There is no fixed list of crimes that fall under the umbrella of crimes involving 
moral turpitude. Rather, adjudicators must determine whether conduct involves 
moral turpitude using the categorical approach, which requires a complex analysis 
of the elements of a criminal statute to determine whether all violations of the law 
that have a realistic probability of being prosecuted involve moral turpitude.147 If 
the law punishes conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, then under the 
categorical approach, convictions under that law do not involve moral turpitude.148 
Courts have concluded that several categories of prostitution-related crimes involve 
moral turpitude, including prostitution and only recently, solicitation.149 
1. Prostitution — It is long-standing precedent that prostitution is a crime 
involving moral turpitude.150 But very few cases explain why prostitution involves 
moral turpitude, instead assuming that prostitution is a crime involving moral 
 
143. In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (BIA 1988); see also Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556, 
561 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 139 (BIA 1989)); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 
F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004); Marciano v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th 
Cir. 1971). 
144. In re G-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 59, 60 (BIA 1941). See generally Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: 
Why Moral Turpitude is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 653–57 (2012) (detailing the history 
and definition of the term “crime involving moral turpitude”). 
145. See, e.g., Michel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“[C]orrupt scienter is the touchstone of moral turpitude.”); In re Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 
777 (BIA 1968) (“[M]oral turpitude normally inheres in the intent.”). Some courts, when considering 
crimes involving moral turpitude, have bypassed the inquiry of prevailing social mores, opting instead 
to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude by the element of scienter to avoid grappling 
with the more difficult question of assessing morality. See Julie Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 
UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1059–67 (describing how an analysis of scienter has become a “stand-in[ ] for 
moral turpitude cases at the margins”). The cases do not provide coherent and reasoned justifications 
for this departure away from an analysis of society’s moral beliefs. See id. (“The use of a scienter analysis 
as a proxy for moral turpitude has accomplished a dubious objectivity at the expense of coherence.”). 
146. See, e.g., Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Simon-Kerr, supra note 
145, at 1059 & n.417. 
147. See In re Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 831 (BIA 2016). 
148. See In re Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 2016); see also In re R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 448 
(BIA 1954). 
149. Case law on whether prostitution-related crimes involve moral turpitude has been relatively 
limited, as noncitizens can be captured by the prostitution-specific inadmissibility ground, and until 
1990, could have been captured by the prostitution-specific deportability ground. See supra notes 88–
89, 109–111, 126–127 and accompanying text. 
150. See In re W-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951). The AAO, on the other hand, concluded 
in a non-precedential decision that prostitution does not involve moral turpitude because “if the sexual 
conduct affects only consenting adults then it may not be a crime involving moral turpitude.” See In re 
Applicant, 2008 WL 4051913, at *3 (AAO May 12, 2008). 
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turpitude.151 Matter of W-, one of the first BIA cases to address whether prostitution 
involves moral turpitude, concluded in 1951 without citations or reasoning that it 
was “well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral 
turpitude.”152 Subsequent courts of appeals decisions have cited Matter of W- 
authoritatively, creating an echo chamber concluding without reasoning that 
prostitution is a crime involving moral turpitude.153 Case law on other prostitution-
related crimes, which can involve a higher degree of moral culpability than simple 
prostitution, also has fueled this echo chamber, with courts equating prostitution 
and other prostitution-related crimes to support the conclusion that all prostitution-
related crimes involve moral turpitude.154 
In 2018, the BIA revisited whether prostitution involves moral turpitude in 
dicta in a case about cockfighting.155 The BIA summarily stated that prostitution “is 
so contrary to the standards of a civilized society as to be morally reprehensible”156 
because “of the socially degrading nature of commercialized sexual services . . . .”157 
Like in In re W-, the BIA again assumed that prostitution involves moral turpitude. 
One of the few cases that has attempted to explain why prostitution involves 
moral turpitude is Rohit v. Holder from the Ninth Circuit in 2012.158 To ultimately 
conclude that solicitation involves moral turpitude, Rohit reasoned that prostitution 
is a crime involving moral turpitude because it “always involves sexual exploitation,” 
unlike some other sexual crimes that do not involve moral turpitude.159 The decision 
does not define exploitation, nor does it provide support for this sweeping 
statement, which has been widely contradicted.160 
 
151. See, e.g., In re W-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401. Generally, courts have assumed that crimes of “sexual 
deviance” involve moral turpitude. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 145, at 1007. 
152. In re W-, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 402; see also In re S-L-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 398 (BIA 1949) 
(providing the Central Office conclusion that pandering is a crime involving moral turpitude because 
of the “turpitudinous nature of prostitution”). An earlier case held that even forced prostitution was a 
crime involving moral turpitude. In re E-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 505 (BIA 1943) (concluding crime of 
“compulsory prostitution of women” involves moral turpitude). 
153. See, e.g., Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2016) (affording In re W- Chevron 
deference); Florentino-Francisco v. Lynch, 611 Fed. App’x 936, 938 (10th Cir. May 27, 2015) (citing In 
re W- as precedent); Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); see also In re Ortega-
Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382, 391–92 (2018) (“Prostitution is unquestionably a crime involving moral 
turpitude under the immigration laws” (citing In re W-, 4. I. & N. Dec. 401).). 
154. See, e.g., Francisco-Florentino, 611 Fed. App’x at 938 (citing a variety of BIA decisions on 
prostitution and other prostitution-related crimes to conclude that the “BIA has long viewed 
prostitution-related crimes as morally turpitudinous”). 
155. In re Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382. 
156. Id. at 386. The BIA cited Rohit v. Holder for this proposition. However, Rohit ’s reasoning 
on why prostitution involves moral turpitude is deeply flawed. See infra notes 158–160, 273–276 and 
accompanying text. 
157. Id. at 386. The BIA provided no support or further explanation for its statement that 
commercialized sexual services are socially degrading. See id. 
158. Rohit, 670 F.3d 1085. 
159. Id. at 1090; see also infra text accompanying notes 166–168. 
160. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (describing choice to engage in sex work). 
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Outside of the crimes involving moral turpitude context, the Supreme Court 
explained why prostitution was immoral in 1908 in United States v. Bitty.161 Although 
not controlling for crimes involving moral turpitude, Bitty still is instructive in 
deciphering judicial attitudes towards prostitution by noncitizens. The Supreme 
Court said that the root of immorality in prostitution stemmed not from the fact 
that it involved a commercial transaction for sex, but from the fact that it involved 
indiscriminate sex.162 The Supreme Court reasoned that indiscriminate sex had 
detrimental effects on families and thereby on United States society, showing the 
Court’s concern over safeguarding monogamous marriages.163 
2. Solicitation — Although courts have long recognized prostitution as a 
crime involving moral turpitude, they only more recently recognized solicitation as 
such, even though states had started to recognize solicitation as a crime since the 
latter half of the twentieth century.164 
 
161. United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1908); see also supra notes 54–55 (summarizing Bitty’s 
discussion of the “immoral purpose” language from the 1907 Act). 
162. See Bitty, 208 U.S. at 401. When defining prostitution, the Court stated that “[i]t refers  
to women who, for hire or without hire, offer their bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with  
men.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Cox v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 49, 52–53 (1917) (collecting cases); 
Commonwealth v. Cook, 53 Mass. 93, 97 (1846) (explaining that Webster’s Dictionary defines 
prostitution as “the act or practice of offering the body to an indiscriminate intercourse with men”). 
But see Cook, 53 Mass. at 97–98 (defining prostitution as used in St. 1845, c. 216 as “the act of permitting 
illicit intercourse for hire, an indiscriminate intercourse . . . .”); State v. Stovell, 54 Me. 24, 27 (1866) 
(defining prostitute as “a female given to indiscriminate lewdness for gain”); THOMAS C. MACKEY, 
RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION, DISORDERLY HOUSES, AND VICE 
DISTRICTS, 1870–1917, at 51–54 (1987) (collecting cases from the mid-1800s defining prostitution, 
including those that did and did not include gain as an element). 
163. See Bitty, 208 U.S. at 401 (“The lives and example of [prostitutes] are in hostility to the idea 
of the family as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and one woman  
in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our  
civilization . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted).). 
164. See DECKER, supra note 12, at 82–83; infra note 220 and accompanying text (collecting 
sources discussing the history of solicitation laws). Earlier, some jurisdictions made it unlawful to visit 
houses of prostitution. See, e.g., Batesville v. Smythe, 138 Ark. 276, 277 (1919) (analyzing a city ordinance 
on prostitution that also criminalized “every male person visiting any room or tenement so used and 
occupied for the purpose of illicit intercourse . . .”); Ex parte Johnson, 73 Cal. 228, 228 (1887) 
(describing city of Stockton ordinance No. 229, which made it unlawful “for any person  
to . . . frequent . . . any [locations] kept, conducted, occupied, or maintained for the purpose of 
prostitution”); Brockway v. People, 2 Hill 558 (N.Y. 1842) (“Individuals in the habit of resorting to 
[houses of ill fame] may . . . be punished as disorderly persons” (internal citation omitted).). However, 
a Texas court held that occasional association between a man and a prostitute did not fall under the 
vagrancy law. See Ellis v. State, 65 Tex. Crim. 480, 481 (1912) (“The [vagrancy] statute was intended to 
reach a class of persons who associated with prostitutes as their equals, or who associated with them in 
public, and was not intended to make a vagrant of a person who, at night, went occasionally to the 
room of a woman with loose morals, and yet who at no other time was seen in her company.”). 
 Parallel to the immigration context, solicitation historically has been less commonly prosecuted 
than prostitution. Additionally, buyers generally have been less frequently targeted for arrest than  
sellers. See infra note 225. 
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The first published decision to recognize solicitation as a crime involving 
moral turpitude under immigration law was Rohit v. Holder in the Ninth Circuit.165 
Rohit referenced prostitution in reaching this conclusion, holding that “[t]here is no 
meaningful distinction that would lead us to conclude that engaging in an act of 
prostitution is a crime of moral turpitude but that soliciting or agreeing to engage 
in an act of prostitution is not.”166 Rohit reasoned that “soliciting an act of 
prostitution is not significantly less ‘base, vile, and depraved’ than engaging in an 
act of prostitution.”167 The court explained that “[s]olicitation is the direct precursor 
to the act” and that “the base act is the intended result of the base request or 
offer.”168 Rohit did not analyze whether solicitation is a crime involving moral 
turpitude independent of prostitution. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have 
recently followed suit, concluding solicitation is a crime involving moral 
turpitude.169 These cases do not provide any additional rationale on why solicitation 
involves moral turpitude, aside from its connection to prostitution.170 
The BIA in a non-precedential decision also concluded that solicitation 
involves moral turpitude.171 It so reasoned due to “the impact offenses such as 
solicitation of prostitution play in the illicit sex trade, with the violator who solicits 
a prostitute not knowing whether the prostitute is a ‘captive’ of a trafficking 
organization, or controlled by a pimp or a more sinister person . . . .”172 
 
165. Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012). An unpublished decision recognized 
solicitation as a crime involving moral turpitude as early as 1996. See Ahmed v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 92 F.3d 1196, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 1996) (unpublished) (affirming the 
noncitizen’s deportation order based on two crimes involving moral turpitude, one of which was 
“prostitution as a patron”). Ahmed did not explain why “prostitution as a patron” involves moral 
turpitude. See id. The BIA may have recognized solicitation as a crime involving moral turpitude as early 
as 1947 in an unpublished case. See In re S-L-, 3. I. & N. Dec. 396, 397–98 (BIA 1949) (citing In re M-, 
A-6030668 (BIA 1947)). In re S-L- cites In re M- for the proposition that “the crime of soliciting 
prostitution involves moral turpitude.” See In re S-L-, 3. I. & N. Dec. at 397–98 (citing In re M-, A-
6030668). The ambiguity stems from the fact that the term “solicitation” can refer to “an offer to pay 
or accept money in exchange for sex.” Solicitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Outside 
of the immigration context, the Fifth Circuit recognized the “crime of soliciting for prostitution” as a 
crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of the admission of a prior criminal record in a criminal 
case. Thompson v. United States, 245 F.2d 232, 232 (5th Cir. 1957). 
166. Rohit, 670 F.3d at 1090. 
167. Id. at 1089. 
168. Id. at 1089–90. 
169. See Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2016); Gomez-Gutierrez v. Lynch, 811 
F.3d 1053, 1058–59 (8th Cir. 2016); Perez v. Lynch, 630 Fed. App’x 870, 873 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2015); 
see also Florentino-Francisco v. Lynch, 611 Fed. App’x 936, 938 (10th Cir. May 27, 2015). 
170. See, e.g., Florentino-Francisco, 611 Fed. App’x at 938 (“If prostitution is inherently base, vile, 
or depraved, so too is the attempt to engage a prostitute by solicitation. Both crimes share a similar 
intent and result in the same act.”). However, the AAO concluded in a non-precedential decision that 
patronizing a prostitute is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not involve a “vicious 
or corrupt mind” and is not “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, 
or depraved.” In re Applicant, 2009 WL 3554141, at *3 (AAO July 1, 2009). 
171. In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *6–7 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014). 
172. Id. 
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Although there is recent case law on solicitation, crimes involving moral 
turpitude jurisprudence on prostitution, like the prostitution-specific inadmissibility 
ground, generally has not been critically reevaluated in recent times. One area of 
immigration law that has seen some change relatively recently, however, is relief and 
exceptions for noncitizens who are trafficked or forced into prostitution. 
C. Relief, Waivers, and Exceptions 
Although immigration law generally treats prostitution harshly, recently-added 
provisions provide specific relief for some noncitizens involved in prostitution. 
Noncitizens involved in prostitution may also be able to take advantage of some 
general waivers and exceptions for low-level crimes. These provisions show some 
recognition that prostitution can be a form of victimization and that it is not a 
serious crime. 
T and U nonimmigrant statuses are relatively new forms of relief available to 
certain victims of human trafficking or serious crimes, respectively.173 Sex 
trafficking victims can qualify for both T and U nonimmigrant statuses.174 
Noncitizens who are forced into prostitution but not trafficked and who cooperate 
with law enforcement may qualify for U nonimmigrant status as well as noncitizens 
who may have voluntarily engaged in sex work and provide information relating to 
prostitution activities to law enforcement.175 
Waivers for noncitizens convicted of prostitution are available under certain 
circumstances. These waivers allow a noncitizen to avoid some immigration 
penalties. A noncitizen may apply for a waiver of most of the grounds of 
inadmissibility, including prostitution, when seeking U or T nonimmigrant status.176 
DHS may also waive prostitution for victims of domestic violence applying for relief 
under the Violence Against Women Act if it was the result of force, fraud, or 
coercion in certain circumstances.177 
Some noncitizens involved in prostitution may also qualify for discretionary 
waivers of the prostitution and crime involving moral turpitude inadmissibility 
 
173. INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T); INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(U). 
174. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii); 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(a) (2018). 
175. See INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii); E-mail from Sabrina Talukder, 
Staff Attorney, The Legal Aid Soc’y, to author (Aug. 21, 2018) (on file with author). 
176. INA § 212(d)(13)–(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(13)–(14) (providing the waivers of 
inadmissibility for T and U nonimmigrant status). 
177. 8 C.F.R. § 204. This exception only applies if the noncitizen has not been convicted of 
prostitution, implying that either law enforcement does not target individuals forced into prostitution 
for arrest or that a duress defense in criminal court is sufficient protection from a conviction, neither 
of which is always true. See id. § 204.2(c)(1); Francisco Zornosa, Protecting Human Trafficking Victims 
from Punishment and Promoting Their Rehabilitation: The Need for an Affirmative Defense, 22 WASH. & 
LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 177, 188–89 (2016) (discussing the shortcomings of a duress defense for 
survivors of sex trafficking). 
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grounds.178 Additionally, one prostitution conviction generally is not enough to 
trigger the crimes involving moral turpitude provisions under the petty offense 
exception.179 Lastly, immigration law recognizes that prostitution is not a crime that 
is serious enough to warrant deportation of asylees.180 These laws are in stark 
contrast to the harsh penalties that prostitution can otherwise trigger. 
By providing waivers and relief for prostitution in certain instances, 
immigration laws now recognize that prostitution is not always a serious crime and 
that it can involve the victimization of sellers of sex.181 Regardless, current laws 
continue to focus on sellers of sex as bad actors, a legacy of turn of the twentieth 
century legislation focused on morality. 
III. MORALITY OF SELLERS OF SEX 
This Part analyzes societal perceptions of the morality of sellers of sex, and 
how such views have changed since turn of the twentieth century. Sellers of sex 
were previously viewed as threats to society and family due largely to the perception 
that nonmarital sex is immoral, and because blame for prostitution was leveled only 
at women.182 As consensual nonmarital sexual conduct between adults generally has 
become permissible, both morally and in criminal law, society has moved away from 
viewing sellers of sex wholesale as “fallen” women.183 Societal views on prostitution 
remain complex, but with the move away from a moral framing, there is an increased 
recognition of the economic motivations that often lead individuals to sell sex and 
of the victimization of individuals forced into prostitution. There is also a 
recognition of other more culpable parties in the activity. These recognitions are 
evidence of a growing societal shift to no longer view sellers of sex as immoral. 
A. Morality of Sexual Conduct: From Marriage to Consent 
Changes in societal perceptions of prostitution and sellers of sex are relevant 
to prostitution-related immigration laws for two main reasons. First, crimes 
involving moral turpitude jurisprudence requires consideration of prevailing social 
attitudes when determining whether a noncitizen’s conduct involves moral 
turpitude.184 Second, the prostitution-related immigration laws developed around 
the turn of the twentieth century as a result of morality-based justifications—to 
 
178. INA § 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (providing a waiver of most of the grounds 
of inadmissibility, including prostitution and crimes involving moral turpitude, for noncitizens applying 
for nonimmigrant visas); INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (providing a waiver of, inter alia, the 
prostitution and crime involving moral turpitude inadmissibility grounds for noncitizens applying for 
immigrant status). 
179. INA § 212(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A). 
180. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
181. See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the 
forms of relief available for trafficking survivors, which recognizes women can be victims needing 
immigration relief). 
182. See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text. 
183. See infra notes 198–204 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra note 145. 
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keep undesirable noncitizen women out of the United States.185 Because these laws 
remain on the books in essentially the same form, reviewing societal views on the 
morality of sellers of sex is necessary to determine whether the underlying 
justifications of the laws are still valid. 
Societal change, however, is notoriously difficult to approximate, with many 
open questions on how to measure morality.186 Although there are many proxies 
for changes in societal views, this Part focuses on criminal law. Criminal law can be 
a useful point of reference for two main reasons. First, it is a useful measure for 
social change without overstating such change. Criminal law tends to be 
conservative in the sense that it responds slowly to changes in societal views, both 
in terms of penal laws themselves and enforcement practices.187 Second, criminal 
law directly impacts the immigration system, with criminal activity triggering 
immigration consequences. 
In terms of both criminal law and prevailing social views of morality, marriage 
delineated permissible and impermissible sexual conduct around the turn of the 
twentieth century188—adultery and sodomy were not only socially unacceptable, but 
generally also criminalized, whereas marital rape was not.189 Since the 1950s, 
consent, rather than marriage, has become increasingly important when evaluating 
whether sexual conduct is permissible.190 Consensual nonmarital sex is generally no 
longer viewed as impermissible and immoral.191 Consent has affected the 
 
185. See supra Part I. Part III focuses on morality since the late 1800s, since that is when 
Congress passed the first prostitution-related immigration laws. See supra Part I. 
186. Courts have recognized that it is difficult, if not impossible, for society to agree on issues 
of morality. See, e.g., Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2010) (“There is simply no 
overall agreement on many issues of morality in contemporary society.”). 
187. The BIA has used criminal law to approximate social change in crimes involving moral 
turpitude cases. See infra notes 249, 251–252 and accompanying text. 
188. See Judith R. Walkowitz, The Politics of Prostitution, 6 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 123, 
131 (1980); see also Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61  
S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 781 (1988) (“By tying sex to procreation, the traditional view functions to cement 
the relationship between biological parents and their children and to promote the family as the key 
social institution.”). See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9–13 (1965) 
(“Marriage is part of the structure of our society and it is also the basis of a moral code which condemns 
fornication and adultery.”). 
189. See Chamallas, supra note 188, at 781–82, 784–90 (describing “traditional view” of sexual 
conduct, where the only acceptable sexual conduct occurs within marriage and ties sex to procreation, 
as the prevalent legal view from the turn of the twentieth century to World War II); see also id. at 784 
n.34 and accompanying text (describing laws punishing adultery and sodomy). Fornication (sexual 
intercourse between unmarried persons), without aggravating factors, was considered “furtive illicit 
intercourse or . . . immoral indulgence,” but was not uniformly criminalized in the United States. See In 
re R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 452–54 (1954). 
190. See Chamallas, supra note 188, at 790, 793–94 (describing the increase in prominence in the 
United States legal system of the “liberal view” of sexual conduct based on consent after World  
War II, which began to replace marriage as the “crucial determinant of the lawfulness of sexual 
conduct”). See generally COTT, supra note 25, at 180–99 (discussing changing gender roles during and 
after World War II). 
191. See Chamallas, supra note 188, at 781–82, 784–90. One exception is extramarital sexual 
conduct. But when extramarital sexual conduct takes place in the context of prostitution, the person in 
the relationship and not the seller of sex is generally viewed as the culpable party. This contemporary 
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development of criminal law, as much consensual sexual conduct previously viewed 
as immoral is no longer criminalized or if the laws remain on the books, they are no 
longer enforced.192 
The treatment of prostitution by criminal law remains one exception to this 
consent-based framework.193 However, the concept of consent has started to 
inform societal views on prostitution. Individuals trafficked or forced to sell sex are 
now almost universally viewed as victims who need protection, in contrast to views 
around the turn of the twentieth century when such women were seen as immoral 
and culpable due to their participation, albeit unwilling, in sexual activity outside of 
marriage.194 
The concept of consent also informs societal views on individuals who engage 
in prostitution but are not forced or trafficked. Certain segments of society believe 
for various reasons that no one can truly consent to prostitution and that it is thus 
a form of violence against women.195 This position is supported by factions of 
feminists as well as certain conservatives, including some religious conservatives.196 
Feminists who hold this view believe that individuals who think they are choosing 
prostitution are actually being coerced by structural barriers, including extreme 
poverty and the patriarchal system.197 Conservatives who support this position 
continue to limit permissible sexual conduct to the confines of heterosexual 
marriage, and to view prostitution in terms of morality, finding it degrading to 
women and thus not a true choice.198 Both groups view sellers of sex as victims who 
 
view contrasts with beliefs around the turn of the twentieth century blaming sellers of sex for such 
transgressions. See, e.g., supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text; infra notes 212–214 and 
accompanying text. 
192. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 
1861–2003, at 121–27, 164–65 (2008); Traci Shallbetter Stratton, No More Messing Around: Substantive 
Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 769  
(1998). Additionally, criminal law created new sexual crimes for lack of consent, namely marital rape. 
See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1373 (2000). 
193. See Chamallas, supra note 188, at 794 (“With respect to prostitution . . . , the liberal ideology 
did not succeed in changing formal legal doctrine.”); see also Elizabeth M. Johnson, Note, Buyers Without 
Remorse: Ending the Discriminatory Enforcement of Prostitution Laws, 92 TEX. L. REV. 717, 720–25 
(2014) (detailing the history of prostitution-related criminal laws in the United States). 
194. See supra text accompanying notes 68–72 (describing the incongruous practice of 
recognizing women forced into prostitution as victims, but nevertheless penalizing such women under 
the immigration laws). 
195. See Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES 
128, 132–33 (2007); Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform 
and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1665–66 & nn.26–28 (2010). 
196. See Chuang, supra note 195, at 1680–82 & nn.99–105; Sheila Jeffreys, Beyond ‘Agency’ and 
‘Choice’ in Theorizing Prostitution, in PROSTITUTION, HARM AND GENDER INEQUALITY: THEORY, 
RESEARCH AND POLICY, supra note 135, at 75–83. 
197. See HOBSON, supra note 135, at 5 (“They [some feminist groups] . . . assert[ed] that no 
woman freely chose prostitution—that extreme coercion, desperate poverty, or mental derangement 
explained this phenomenon.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 281 (2011). 
198. See Chuang, supra note 195, at 1665–66. 
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should be helped to leave prostitution, but do not advocate for general 
decriminalization or legalization, believing that criminal law can be used to target 
others involved in prostitution to further the goal of ultimately abolishing the 
practice, due to their view that it is harmful to sellers of sex under all 
circumstances.199 
Another segment of the population, including some liberals and feminists, 
believe that individuals can consent to sex work, and find the victimization 
narrative, which conflates sex work and trafficking, to be problematic and 
paternalistic.200 These groups push for decriminalization and legalization of 
prostitution, and believe that any enforcement efforts should be directed towards 
trafficking and other forms of forced prostitution.201 
Despite these differences in viewpoint, individuals who sell sex are 
decreasingly viewed as the bad actors by both camps.202 This recognition can be 
seen through some positive trends in criminal law, discussed below.203 There is also 
increased recognition among both camps that sellers of sex, even individuals who 
choose to engage in the practice, can be victimized with impunity because they are 
often unable or unwilling to seek help due to risk of arrest and stigma.204 
B. Societal Views on the Morality of Sellers of Sex Through the Lens of the  
Criminal Justice System 
The criminal laws in various ways reflect this societal shift in attitudes towards 
sellers of sex, moving away from viewing the seller as a fallen or immoral woman. 
Criminal laws prohibiting prostitution started to be enforced regularly against sellers 
of sex in the early twentieth century, when the social purity movement gained 
 
199. See HOBSON, supra note 135, at 5 (“Feminists have sought stricter enforcement of laws 
against keepers and pimps, and . . . criminal penalties for men who buy prostitutes’ services.”); Chuang, 
supra note 195, at 1669 (“[W]omen prostitutes should not be penalized themselves but instead should 
be the target of rescue and rehabilitation efforts.”). 
200. See HOBSON, supra note 135, at 220–22; Chuang, supra note 195, at 1671 (describing this 
faction’s insistence “on a distinction between trafficking and prostitution”). 
201. See Chuang, supra note 195, at 1670–71 & nn.49–56. 
202. But some segments of society continue to view sellers of sex as immoral. See, e.g., ROGER 
SCRUTON, SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE EROTIC 337–47 (1986) (arguing that sex 
not for the purpose of expressing love is immoral); Trump Lawyer Rudy Giuliani Has No Respect for 
Stormy Daniels, BBC NEWS ( June 7, 2018) (“Someone who sells his or her body for money has no 
good name. . . . I may be old fashioned” (quoting former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani).); see 
also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, BOOK III, PROVIDENCE, Part II, ch. 122 at 1–5 
(arguing under natural law theory that sex outside of marriage and not for purpose of procreation is 
sin). 
203. The criminal justice system’s treatment of prostitution remains highly problematic in many 
respects, however. See infra note 230. 
204. See, e.g., Barbara G. Brents & Kathryn Hausbeck, Violence and Legalized Brothel Prostitution 
in Nevada, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 270, 287–90 (2005) (“Fear of violence is very much a part 
of the culture of prostitution.”); Roger Matthews, Female Prostitution and Victimization: A Realist Analysis, 
21 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 85, 89 (2015). 
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momentum.205 This anti-vice movement, supported by feminist and Christian 
groups, endorsed the view that sex was for the purpose of procreation.206 They 
advocated for legislation and enforcement against prostitution to protect families 
and society from the moral threat of women who sold sex.207 By the mid-1920s, 
every state had criminalized prostitution in some form.208 
Even though the sale of sex was generally a misdemeanor like today,209 case 
law referred to female sellers of sex as serious criminals, and antithetical to the ideals 
of morality and womanhood.210 Courts described sellers of sex using language such 
as “fallen” women211 and “wayward girls.”212 Such women were believed to 
“present a greater single element of economic, social, moral, and hygenic [sic] loss 
than is the case with any other single criminal class” because of their engagement in 
a “vicious and degrading vocation,” steeped in “sin and shame.”213 
Female sellers of sex alone were blamed for prostitution, and were singled out 
by state penal codes as particular dangers to society until relatively recently.214 States 
 
205. DECKER, supra note 12, at 61, 67–69 (describing the tolerance of prostitution before the 
early twentieth century and the reasons for subsequently “ending toleration of prostitutes”). 
206. See COTT, supra note 25, at 123–24 (“Purity reformers intended . . . to stamp out 
extramarital sexual relations and to make sure that sex stayed linked to monogamous marriage and 
childbearing, as fundamental Christian morality required.”). Feminists supported the social purity 
movement because it “seemed to be an attack on aggressive male sexuality and the double standard [for 
sexuality].” Walkowitz, supra note 188, at 131. 
207. See COTT, supra note 25, at 123–24; DECKER, supra note 12, at 67–70 (“At the beginning 
of the second decade of the twentieth century, a monumental and relatively effective movement was 
instituted to abrogate the toleration of prostitution which generally existed in America.”); THOMAS  
C. MACKEY, PURSUING JOHNS: CRIMINAL LAW REFORM, DEFENDING CHARACTER, AND NEW 
YORK CITY’S COMMITTEE OF FOURTEEN, 1920–1930, at 26, 38–39 (2005); Timothy J. Gilfoyle, 
Prostitution, in THE READER’S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 875–76 (Eric Foner & John A 
Garraty eds., 1991). 
208. See MACKEY, supra note 207, at 39; Charles H. Whitebread, Freeing Ourselves from the 
Prohibition Idea in the Twenty-First Century, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 235, 243 (2000). 
209. See, e.g., Coker v. City of Ft. Smith, 162 Ark. 567 (1924); State v. Phillips, 26 N.D. 206 
(1913) (“Any female who frequents or lives in houses of ill fame, or who commits fornication for hire, 
shall be deemed a prostitute, and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Cox v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 49 
(1917). For a first offense, present-day laws provide for imprisonment from one day to up to one  
year, and fines range from $50 up to $10,000, with this upper limit being an outlier. See, e.g.,  
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-201 (2017) (up to six months and/or $50–$750); D.C. CODE § 22-2701 
(2017) (one to ninety days, and $500); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14 (2017) (up to one year and/or 
$2,500); WIS. STAT. § 944.30 (2017) (up to nine months or $10,000). 
210. See, e.g., Milliken v. City Council of Weatherford, 54 Tex. 388, 394 (1881) (describing sellers 
of sex as an “unfortunate and degraded class . . . fallen beneath the true mission of women”). 
211. In re Carey, 207 P. 271, 307 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922); Milliken, 54 Tex. at 394. 
212. People v. Jelke, 135 N.E.2d 213, 216 (N.Y. 1956). 
213. Carey, 207 P. at 305; San Antonio v. Salvation Army, 127 S.W. 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910). 
214. See, e.g., United States v. Curran, 8 F.2d 355, 355 (2d Cir. 1925) (considering a New York 
statute that “makes any woman a ‘vagrant’ who ‘offers to commit prostitution’” (emphasis added)); Carey, 
207 P. at 271, 274 (holding “men cannot commit the crime of carrying on the business of prostitution, 
except as accessories,” even where the relevant ordinance was gender-neutral); People v. Brandt, 306 
P.2d 1069, 1070 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1956) (“Obviously a male cannot be a prostitute . . . .”); 
Sumpter v. State, 306 N.E.2d 95, 100–01 (Ind. 1974) (“The Indiana legislature has made a policy 
decision that prostitution is a significant social problem only among females. Such a decision is clearly 
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subjected sellers of sex to prolonged detention for the ostensible purpose of 
rehabilitation.215 A California court defended this prolonged detention, explaining 
that sellers of sex “constitute[d] a menace to the morals and social welfare of 
mankind” and that “[t]he right to quarantine . . . implies the right to continue the 
isolation so long as the danger remains . . . for the laudable purpose of reclaiming 
[the seller of sex] and destroying the probability of a subsequent renewal of the 
danger.”216 
One court even treated women who were forced into prostitution as 
immoral.217 Even when there was recognition that a woman may engage in 
prostitution “due to social maladjustments or to the abuse of her affections,” the 
relevant criminal law still did not view her as “an innocent person” but rather a 
person “steeped in crime.”218 The stigma and threat to society by women involved 
in prostitution outweighed all other considerations, including whether a woman was 
coerced, manipulated, or forced by environmental factors. 
Although prostitution remains widely criminalized, the criminal justice system 
has shed much of its previous morality-laden language to describe sellers of sex, 
especially as views on nonmarital sex have changed. State penal codes no longer 
single out women and sellers of sex for punishment for prostitution.219 States began 
 
reasonable and, therefore, should be sustained.”); see also Jane H. Aiken, Differentiating Sex from Sex: 
The Male Irresistible Impulse, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 380 (1983) (discussing the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s upholding of a gender-specific prostitution statute in 1974 and concluding 
that “women’s use of [sexual] power creates a moral problem that justifies legislative action”). 
 Men were rarely arrested or punished for buying sex or engaging in prostitution themselves. See 
BASS, supra note 115, at 30; HOBSON, supra note 135, at 34; see also People v. Edwards, 180 N.Y.S. 631, 
635 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1920) (“[I]t has been the custom . . . to arrest the women and let the men  
go . . . .”). Where state statutes did punish men, they were not subject to the same harsh penalties as 
women. See Leffel v. Municipal Court, 54 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 569, 574 (1976) (“The act of her partner in 
vice, while equally as nefarious, is neither commercialized nor continuous. It is proper enough to send 
him to jail for his offense, but it is doubtful if the scheme of impounding him for purposes of 
reformation would commend itself to the lawgiver.”). 
215. Misdemeanors at that time were commonly punished by a term of imprisonment not to 
exceed one year, but statutes allowing commitment to a “reformative” institution permitted 
significantly longer periods of commitment for women convicted of prostitution. See People ex  
rel. Duntz v. Coon, 22 N.Y.S. 865, 866, 870 (Gen. Term 1893) (recognizing that persons convicted of 
misdemeanors are generally subject to imprisonment for a term not to exceed one year, but that the 
relevant statute imposes imprisonment for up to five years for women convicted of a prostitution-
related misdemeanor in a “house of refuge for women”); see also Carey, 207 P. at 271–72 (describing a 
California law subjecting women convicted of prostitution to indeterminate commitment at an 
institution aimed at the “reformation of delinquent women”). Such disproportionate “rehabilitative” 
punishment for only women continued until at least the 1960s, when it started to be struck down as 
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 
(D. Conn. 1968). 
216. Carey, 207 P. at 274. 
217. See id. (“The fallen woman alone carries on the traffic [prostitution]. If others prey upon 
her frailty, it is only with her co-operation—willing or unwilling.”). 
218. Id. 
219. See Johnson, supra note 193, at 723–24 & nn.46–47. One court expressly disavowed the 
language of “fallen women” as “reek[ing] with a condescending attitude that has no place in today’s 
jurisprudence.” See McNeil v. State, 739 A.2d 80, 94 (Md. 1999); see also Leffel, 54 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 569. 
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to regularly criminalize solicitation in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
sometimes with parity in punishment with the sale of sex, marking a distinct shift 
in attitude towards prostitution.220 Sellers of sex also are increasingly viewed as 
victims in certain scenarios.221 Many states have recognized that forced prostitution 
should not be subject to criminal sanction by providing affirmative defenses as well 
as vacatur and expungement of convictions for victims of trafficking or forced 
prostitution.222 There is also an increased awareness that economic factors lead 
many individuals to sell sex, evidenced by state rehabilitative diversion programs 
designed to encourage sellers of sex to leave sex work.223 
This view that sellers of sex can be victims has led to a slow shift in 
enforcement against other parties involved in prostitution. Enforcement priorities 
in some jurisdictions have shifted towards buyers, pimps, and traffickers, especially 
as a result of increased concern surrounding sex trafficking.224 Although women 
 
220. See Pantea Javidan, Invisible Targets: Juvenile Prostitution, Crackdown Legislation, and the 
Example of California, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 237, 250 (2003) (describing how California 
criminalized buying sex in 1986); Julie Lefler, Note, Shining the Spotlight on Johns: Moving Toward Equal 
Treatment of Male Customers and Female Prostitutes, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 11, 16–17 & n.45 
(1999); see also supra note 164 (discussing early state laws criminalizing visiting houses of prostitution). 
221. See, e.g., State v. Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d 222, 240–41 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), 
aff’d, 881 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016) (discussing the pimp’s “control” over prostitutes and describing the 
prostitutes as “victims”). 
222. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-70-102(c) to 103(c) (West 
2015); FLA. STAT. § 943.045(16) (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-302(b)(2) (LexisNexis 
2017); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.01 (McKinney 
2017) (“[I]t is an affirmative defense that the defendant’s participation in the offense was a result of 
having been a victim of compelling prostitution . . . [or] a victim of sex trafficking . . . .”). See generally 
Zornosa, supra note 177, at 184–85 (discussing state vacatur statutes and affirmative defenses for 
trafficking victims). Despite some progress in the criminal laws to protect against forced prostitution, 
there is still criticism that the criminal laws continue to target individuals who are forced to sell sex.  
See, e.g., Amanda Peters, Modern Prostitution Legal Reform & the Return of Volitional Consent, 3  
VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3–5, 20, 29–39 (2015); Amanda Shapiro, Note, Buyer Beware: Why Johns Should Be 
Charged with Statutory Rape for Buying Sex from a Child, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 449, 461–62, 467–74 (2014). 
223. See BARBARA G. BRENTS ET AL., THE STATE OF SEX 34–41 (2010); Chuang, supra note 
195, at 1699–1702; Shdaimah et al., supra note 2, at 9; infra note 224; see also, e.g., SARAH  
SCHWEIG ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, PROSTITUTION DIVERSION PROGRAMS  
3–5, 9–10 (2012), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/CI_Prostitution 
%207.5.12%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL6U-XXM9]. 
224. See, e.g., Sara Jean Green, ‘Buyer Beware’: Early Success for Initiative Targeting Johns Instead 
of Prostitutes, SEATTLE TIMES, May 16, 2015, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/
buyer-beware-early-success-for-initiative-targeting-johns-instead-of-prostitutes/ (reporting 2014 as the 
first year when “patronizing charges outpaced prostitution charges” (internal quotation omitted)); 
National Law Enforcement Coalition Arrests Record Number of Johns, COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S  
OFF. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.cookcountysheriff.org/national-law-enforcement-coalition-
arrests-record-number-johns/ [https://perma.cc/W3QP-6LLH] (reporting the National Johns 
Suppression Initiative arrested over 1,300 buyers of sex across eighteen states); see also Zak Koeske, 
Dart Says He’s Committed to Combatting Sex Trafficking Despite Challenges, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2017, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/news/ct-sta-dart-back-page-adds-st-0122- 
20170120-story.html (quoting Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart as saying the police “respond to areas 
where we know there’s prostitution going on[,] . . . see what we come across, talk to the women about 
getting out of the business, and . . . try to get the ones we talk to to cooperate with us to find out if 
there are bigger players involved here”). But see id. (reporting that since 2012, the Cook County sheriff’s 
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engaged in street prostitution continue to be targeted for arrest at significantly 
higher rates than male buyers of sex,225 an increasing number of jurisdictions are 
engaging in enforcement efforts directed at buyers.226 Additionally, enforcement of 
prostitution laws generally has decreased dramatically—national arrest statistics for 
prostitution and commercialized vice decreased 55 percent between 1990 and 
2010.227 
Although blame has been moving away from sellers of sex, they still remain 
active targets of criminal laws in most jurisdictions, complicating the question of 
contemporary societal views on prostitution. However, the purpose of these laws 
generally has shifted from punishing a crime against morality to protecting the 
public order as the sale of sex is increasingly viewed as a victimless crime.228 Rather 
than aiming to protect society from women who sell sex, many criminal laws now 
 
office has arrested over 3,000 sellers of sex and johns, but only 37 individuals for human trafficking 
and promoting prostitution). 
 Early laws, especially during the hysteria of the White Slave Panic, see supra note 57, also 
criminalized prostitution-related crimes—such as accepting the earnings of a prostitute, pandering, and 
keeping a house of prostitution—as felonies. See, e.g., People v. Bain, 116 N.E. 615 (Ill. 1917) 
(considering an appeal from a conviction for being a keeper of a house of prostitution); Steven v. State, 
150 S.W. 944 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1912) (considering an appeal from a conviction for pandering); State 
v. Poole, 84 P. 727 (Wash. 1906) (addressing an appeal from a conviction for accepting the earnings of 
a prostitute). But see Javidan, supra note 220, at 250 (describing California’s failure to comprehensively 
outlaw pimping until 1998). 
225. See Shay-Ann M. Heiser Singh, Comment, The Predator Accountability Act: Empowering 
Women in Prostitution to Pursue Their Own Justice, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1035, 1062 (2007) (describing 
the enforcement bias against women); see also HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990-2010, at 2, 4 (2012) (showing that the number of females arrested in the 
United States in 2010 for prostitution and commercialized vice was well over double the number of 
males). Women engaged in street prostitution are easy and visible targets, and police often use arrests 
of such women to bolster their arrest statistics. See BASS, supra note 115, at 30–31. 
226. As of 2012, 826 United States cities and counties had tried enforcement efforts directed at 
individuals who purchase sex. See MICHAEL SHIVELY ET AL., ABT ASSOCIATES, A NATIONAL 
OVERVIEW OF PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING DEMAND REDUCTION EFFORTS:  
FINAL REPORT iii (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238796.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
F89Z-2SQP]. In some states, there is parity between arrests for men and women. See Johnson, supra 
note 193, at 726 n.61 (providing Wisconsin arrest statistics); supra note 224. 
227. SNYDER, supra note 225, at 4 (providing arrest statistics). But see MEREDITH DANK ET  
AL., URBAN INST., CONSEQUENCES OF POLICING PROSTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF  
INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED FOR COMMERCIAL SEX IN NEW YORK CITY  
(2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/89451/consequences-of-policing-
prostitution.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE83-TFFW]. 
228. See In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014) (“In the intervening period, 
views regarding prostitution have indeed undergone a transformation in our society, and simple 
prostitution in some states has become a regulatory offense and is a quality of life crime to prevent 
public disorder.”); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2017) (disorderly conduct misdemeanor); 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 706-640, 706-663 (2017) (petty misdemeanor). However, some states, like 
Wisconsin, retain prostitution as a morality-based crime. Prostitution appears under a section in the 
Wisconsin penal code entitled “Crimes Against Sexual Morality,” which also still criminalizes adultery 
as a felony. WISC. STAT. § 944 (2017). 
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aim to prevent attendant harms that may be associated with prostitution such as 
drug use, violence, and disease.229 
As illustrated by the criminal justice system, sellers of sex are generally no 
longer viewed as immoral actors, as concerns over women’s sexual agency 
threatening societal morality have diminished since the turn of the twentieth 
century. This move away from a singular focus on the corrupting influence of 
women’s sexuality has allowed for increased awareness of the economic motivations 
and structural factors that lead individuals to sell sex, as well as a recognition that 
individuals can be forced to sell sex. Although selling sex remains criminalized and 
the criminal justice system’s approach to prostitution is far from perfect,230 criminal 
law nevertheless reflects fundamental changes in societal views towards the sale of 
sex. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
In light of changing societal views that generally no longer view sellers of sex 
as immoral actors, this Part recommends statutory and jurisprudential reforms to 
prostitution-related immigration laws, which continue to target sellers of sex. The 
development of immigration laws on prostitution has stagnated since the turn of 
the twentieth century, and does not reflect changed understandings of the 
complexities of prostitution. Although there have been a few recent reforms 
focusing on trafficking and forced prostitution, these reforms do not go far 
enough.231 Reforms should be expanded to remove penalties for prostitution, 
including the voluntary sale of sex, both in the prostitution inadmissibility ground 
and in crimes involving moral turpitude jurisprudence. 
 
 
229. See Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 204, at 274; Ronald John Weitzer, The Politics of 
Prostitution in America, in SEX FOR SALE 159–80 (2000); see also State v. Schultz, 582 N.W.2d 113, 117 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a prostitution statute where the “clear secular purpose [was] to protect 
public health and welfare, to prevent other forms of prostitution, and to prevent criminal activity 
associated with prostitution”); cf. NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 441A010-A325, 441A775-A815 (2016) 
(requiring the regular screening of sex workers in licensed brothels to prevent the spread of sexually 
transmitted infections). 
230. One major problem is the continued disproportionate targeting of minority women for 
arrest. See SNYDER, supra note 225, at 2, 4 (providing arrest statistics); see also DANK ET AL., supra note 
227, at 3 (describing how “broken windows policing” led to increased targeting of minority women for 
prostitution arrests); Johnson, supra note 193, at 726 & nn.63–67 (collecting cases where defendants on 
trial for prostitution cited statistics showing enforcement targeting women). Another major problem is 
police practices that lead to the potential for police abuse and increased victimization of sellers of sex, 
such as those that allow officers to engage in sexual contact with suspected sellers of sex prior to  
making an arrest. See Jenavieve Hatch, Sex Workers in Alaska Say Cops Are Abusing Their Power to  
Solicit Sex Acts, HUFFPOST (Aug. 17, 2017, 12:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sex- 
workers-in-alaska-say-cops-are-abusing-their-power-to-solicit-sex_us_596e1d26e4b010d77673e488 
[https://perma.cc/ZP9L-CSCX]. 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 114–118, 173–180. 
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A. Prostitution-Related Inadmissibility Ground 
Prostitution should no longer be an explicit inadmissibility ground under 
section 212(a)(2)(D) of the INA. This provision should also include a carve out for 
the sale of sex in the provision encompassing unlawful commercialized vice. Such 
reforms are necessary because first, this provision, grounded in morality, has not 
been reconsidered since its inception over a century ago, despite changing societal 
views on sellers of sex. Second, prostitution should not be a ground of 
inadmissibility when solicitation is not.232 Finally, this ground should not target 
sellers of sex because its application can be inconsistent and biased, as it does not 
require a conviction. 
First, Congress should remove prostitution from the inadmissibility grounds 
in light of changed views on prostitution and consensual sexual activity generally. 
This ground was developed around the turn of the twentieth century to protect 
United States citizens from the perceived immorality of sellers of sex.233 It has not 
been critically reexamined, and remains a relic of anachronistic morality-based 
immigration legislation, potentially subjecting all sellers of sex, even those who may 
have been forced or coerced, to penalties.234 By contrast, the evolution of criminal 
laws shows that sellers of sex generally are no longer considered serious threats to 
morality and are no longer viewed as seeking to corrupt society and families.235 
Indeed, prostitution is legal in a handful of local jurisdictions in the United States.236 
But even though prostitution laws continue to be enforced in most United States 
jurisdictions, there is a growing recognition that individuals selling sex are not as 
culpable as they were once thought to be, even when they choose sex work, and 
that they can be victims.237 Additionally, criminal laws have started to recognize 
exceptions for individuals forced into prostitution, unlike this inadmissibility 
ground.238 Subjecting noncitizens who engage in prostitution to the harsh penalties 
triggered by this inadmissibility ground thus runs counter to contemporary 
perspectives on the culpability and dangerousness of sellers of sex. 
 
232. This Article is not proposing, however, that solicitation be added as a ground of 
inadmissibility to conform its treatment to that of prostitution under the immigration laws. Although 
there is disagreement on the culpability of buyers of sex, see supra notes 220, 224–227 and accompanying 
text, changes in societal views on consensual sexual activity generally, see supra Part III.A, counsel against 
creating additional immigration restrictions related to sexual morality. Moreover, this Article not only 
advocates for comparable treatment for sellers and buyers of sex, but also for removal of immigration 
penalties for sellers of sex. See infra notes 233–276 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra Part I. 
234. But see supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text (discussing a limited duress exception). 
Other terms in the INA are also relics of the past, including “habitual drunkard” and “crimes involving 
moral turpitude.” See INA § 101(f)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) (2012); see also Holper, supra note 144,  
at 653–57 (detailing the history of the term “crime involving moral turpitude”). See generally  
Jayesh M. Rathod, Distilling Americans: The Legacy of Prohibition on U.S. Immigration Law, 51  
HOUS. L. REV. 781 (2013) (discussing the history of alcohol-related provisions in immigration law). 
235. See supra Part III.B. 
236. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 201.354, 244.345 (2017). 
237. See supra Part III. 
238. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
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Congress has in the past eliminated immigration penalties for some consensual 
sexual conduct, recognizing that these laws no longer reflected societal views on the 
activity. For example, Congress removed the homosexuality inadmissibility ground 
even before the Supreme Court ruled that consensual homosexual conduct is 
constitutionally protected.239 The Immigration Act of 1917 first excluded 
homosexuals from the United States under a provision that prohibited the 
admission of “persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority” certified by a 
physician to be “mentally . . . defective.”240 Homosexuality continued to be subject 
to immigration penalties until 1990 under “psychopathic personality” and “sexual 
deviation” grounds.241 Prior to the enactment of the 1990 legislation, a 
Congressional Report explained that “changing attitudes in American society and 
within the medical community toward . . . sexual orientation require a modification 
of the statute in order to prevent the perpetuation of unfair stigmas, and to ensure 
that fundamental notions of human dignity are respected.”242 The Report 
recommended the repeal of the “sexual deviation” ground “to make it clear that the 
United States does not view personal decision about sexual orientation as a danger 
to other people in our society.”243 Similar to how homosexuality is no longer 
considered a danger to society, sellers of sex are generally no longer viewed by 
society as dangerous and immoral. 
Second, prostitution should no longer be an inadmissibility ground because 
solicitation, the “direct precursor” to prostitution, is not explicitly such a ground.244 
There is no meaningful reason why prostitution should be an inadmissibility ground 
when solicitation is not. Moreover, contemporary understanding is that buyers are 
just as, if not more, culpable than sellers of sex.245 Nevertheless, if buyers of sex do 
 
239. See Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; see also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Although the legislative history reflects concerns over how the 
American public would view the removal of this ground, Congress nevertheless eliminated it. See,  
e.g., STAFF OF H. & S. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND 
THE NATIONAL INTEREST 349 (Comm. Print 1981) (stating the concern of some members of the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy that the “media would focus on such proposed 
changes as eliminating the bar against homosexuals” and recognizing “the controversial nature of some 
of the proposed recommendations on grounds of exclusion”). 
240. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (repealed 1952). 
241. See 104 Stat. 4978; Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 911; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976 and  
Supp. V 1981); Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967) (“The 
legislative history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended  
the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include homosexuals . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 955 (1990)  
(Conf. Rep.). See generally Robert Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities for 
Gay and Lesbian Immigration, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439 (1994) (discussing the history of the 
exclusion of homosexuals). 
242. H.R. REP. NO. 100-882, at 19 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). Unlike prostitution, which is a criminal 
exclusion, the “psychopathic personality” ground was considered to be a health-related exclusion. See 
id. at 19–20 (“Not only is this provision out of step with current notions of privacy and personal dignity, 
it is also inconsistent with contemporary phychiatric [sic] theories.”). 
243. Id. at 20. 
244. See Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2012). 
245. See supra notes 220, 224–226 and accompanying text. 
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not warrant a specific inadmissibility ground in the immigration laws, neither should 
sellers. 
Third, Congress should eliminate prostitution as an inadmissibility ground 
because it presents administrability problems that create inconsistent and biased 
enforcement. The prostitution inadmissibility ground captures conduct that may be 
legal in other jurisdictions, both abroad and in parts of the United States.246 
Accordingly, individuals engaging in lawful conduct may be subject to immigration 
penalties. Additionally, there is no bright-line test to determine whether a 
noncitizen’s conduct falls under this ground—a conviction is not necessary.247 If a 
noncitizen has no convictions, a government official must determine in some other 
way whether he or she has sold sex in the past, or even more challenging, whether 
he or she will sell sex in the future. Like criminal laws that permit police to arrest 
individuals for intent to commit prostitution, which are criticized for allowing police 
to arrest individuals who “look like prostitutes,” this indeterminate standard too can 
lead to abuses and stereotyping by officials trying to determine whether this ground 
applies.248 In light of the above reasons, Congress should eliminate prostitution as 
an inadmissibility ground. 
B. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude 
Not only should Congress remove prostitution from the inadmissibility 
grounds, adjudicators should also conclude prostitution is no longer a crime 
involving moral turpitude. The very definition of crimes involving moral turpitude 
not only allows for, but requires, the reexamination of whether conduct involves 
 
246. See 22 C.F.R. § 40.7(a)(12)(iii) (1990) (“A person who comes under one or more of the 
categories of persons described in INA 212(a)(12) is ineligible to receive a visa under that section even 
if the acts engaged in are not prohibited under the laws of the foreign country where the acts 
occurred.”); Visas; Regulations and Documentation Pertaining to Both Nonimmigrants and Immigrants 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,590-01, 42,594 (Nov. 5, 1987) (same); 
supra text accompanying notes 126–131 (discussing the text of the prostitution inadmissibility ground). 
247. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. But even if a conviction was required, the 
enforcement of prostitution-related criminal laws has a racial and gender bias. See supra note 230. The 
exclusion grounds that captured homosexuality were criticized for similar reasons related to inconsistent 
application. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. & S. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 238 (Comm. Print 1981) (“Others [members of the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy] believe that such language as “mental defect” or 
“sexual deviation” is too vague for consistent, equitable interpretation . . . .”). 
248. See Karen Struening, Walking While Wearing a Dress: Prostitution Loitering Ordinances and 
the Policing of Christopher Street, 3 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 16, 18–19, 46 (2016); Sex Workers at 
Risk: Condoms as Evidence of Prostitution in Four US Cities, HUM. RTS. WATCH ( July 19,  
2012), http://www.hrw.org/node/108771/section/2 [https://perma.cc/NN3K-RVVK] (“Police 
stops . . . are often a result of profiling, a practice of targeting individuals as suspected offenders for 
who they are, what they are wearing and where they are standing, rather than on the basis of any 
observed illegal activity.”); see also SEN. REP. NO. 61-196, at 19 (1909) (describing how immigration 
officials must judge women at ports of entry “mainly by their appearance and the stories they  
tell”); GARDNER, supra note 35, at 52–57 (“[I]mmigration officials attempted to discern immoral from 
moral [Chinese] women through careful observation of women’s appearance and their behavior and 
repeated interrogation of their testimony.”); Abrams, supra note 13, at 682–83 (discussing the 
stereotyping of Chinese women when determining their involvement in prostitution). 
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moral turpitude in light of society’s changed moral views.249 Upon such a 
reexamination of the sale of sex, adjudicators should conclude that it does not 
categorically involve moral turpitude in light of contemporary understandings of the 
victimization of sellers of sex as well as their motivations, which show that their 
conduct is generally no longer considered base, vile, or depraved. 
Case law has recognized this need to review whether prostitution is still a crime 
involving moral turpitude. Acknowledging that it had been “many years” since it 
had addressed this question “in a precedent decision,” the BIA noted a recent 
“transformation” of views on prostitution.250 Using the criminal justice system as a 
proxy for societal views, it noted that “simple prostitution in some states [is 
becoming] a regulatory offense and . . . a quality of life crime to prevent public 
disorder.”251 The Sixth Circuit also recognized society’s changing attitudes towards 
prostitution.252 It went so far as to conclude that “there is now increased attention 
to the question of whether and to what extent prostitution should be 
criminalized.”253 Both, however, declined the opportunity to reconsider whether 
prostitution involves moral turpitude in light of contemporary perspectives.254 
Rather than shirk the thorny question whether prostitution involves moral 
turpitude in contemporary times, adjudicators should confront this issue head on, 
and conclude that the sale of sex is no longer a crime involving moral turpitude.  
Prostitution does not categorically involve moral turpitude because state 
criminal laws capture conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, namely the 
sale of sex by individuals who are trafficked or otherwise forced to sell sex. If not 
all conduct that may be realistically prosecuted under the criminal statute involves 
 
249. The BIA has explained that “the nature of a crime is measured against contemporary moral 
standards and may be susceptible to change based on the prevailing views of society.” In re Torres-
Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83 (BIA 2001) (emphasis added); see also In re Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. &  
N. Dec. 99, 100 n.2 (BIA 2013), rev’d, 834 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2016), remanded to 27 I. & N. Dec. 382 
(BIA 2018) (holding courts must consider “the evolving nature of what conduct society considers to 
be contrary to accepted rules of morality . . . .”). In 2013 and again on remand in 2018, the BIA 
addressed the question whether sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in animal fighting constituted a 
crime involving moral turpitude and used contemporary social norms to ultimately conclude that it 
does. In re Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 390; In re Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 100 n.2. The 
BIA reasoned that it involves “reprehensible conduct,” namely the “intentional infliction of harm or 
pain on sentient beings that are compelled to fight.” In re Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 101–03. As 
support, it cited the “increasing national consensus against this activity” reflected by recent laws 
prohibiting animal fighting. Id. 
250. In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014) (citing Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. &  
N. Dec. at 100 n.2). But see supra notes 153, 155–157 and accompanying text (describing a 2018 BIA 
decision that states in dicta that prostitution is “unquestionably” a crime involving moral turpitude). 
251. In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7. 
252. Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[O]ur society’s—and the BIA’s—views 
regarding prostitution and solicitation of prostitution may continue to transform.”). 
253. Id. (citing Emily Bazelon, Should Prostitution Be a Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2016,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/should-prostitution-be-a-crime.html). 
254. See Reyes, 835 F.3d at 561 (deferring under Chevron to the BIA’s precedential opinions on 
prostitution as a crime involving moral turpitude, concluding that they were not unreasonable); In re 
Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7. 
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moral turpitude, then a conviction under that statute cannot categorically involve 
moral turpitude.255 Individuals who are trafficked or otherwise forced into 
prostitution are routinely prosecuted under state laws criminalizing prostitution.256 
Such individuals do not act with the requisite culpable mental state, nor can their 
conduct be base, vile or depraved since their actions are not voluntary.257 Because 
individuals who are trafficked and forced into prostitution are prosecuted under 
state criminal laws, prostitution cannot categorically involve moral turpitude.  
Additionally, prostitution is increasingly viewed as a form of employment, 
with many individuals being forced to sell sex because of their economic 
circumstances.258 Although prostitution remains criminalized, this cannot be the 
end of the moral turpitude inquiry since “[n]ot every offense contrary to good 
morals involves moral turpitude.”259 Something else is needed for a crime to involve 
moral turpitude—a “vicious motive or a corrupt mind.”260 The sale of sex as a form 
of employment does not reflect a vicious motive or a corrupt mind.261 Although 
society at the turn of the twentieth century wholesale labeled sellers of sex as 
immoral, contemporary understandings of prostitution show that sellers of sex do 
not engage in prostitution to fulfill lustful desires or corrupt society.262 Because not 
 
255. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text (describing the categorical approach). 
256. See DANK ET AL., supra note 227, at 1–5, 10–11, 15–22 (describing arrests and prosecutions 
of trafficking victims for prostitution); supra note 222 (describing the criticism that state criminal laws 
capture individuals who are forced to sell sex). Additionally, in recognition of the fact that their criminal 
laws are capturing individuals trafficked and forced into prostitution, some states have provided for 
vacatur and expungement of prostitution convictions for such victims. See supra note 222.  
257. See supra notes 143–146 (describing the categorical approach). Indeed, recent legislation 
shows a recognition that prostitution can be a form of victimization through its creation of forms of 
immigration relief for noncitizens forced into prostitution. See supra text accompanying notes 114–118. 
258. See supra notes 200, 223 (describing sex work as a form of employment). 
259. In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 190, 194–95 (BIA 1942). The Ninth Circuit went so far as to 
conclude that in the present, “consensual sexual conduct among adults may not be deemed ‘base, vile, 
and depraved’ as a matter of law simply because a majority of people happen to disapprove of a 
particular practice,” and that “[m]ore is required for moral turpitude.” Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 
1132–33 (9th Cir. 2010). 
260. In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 194. 
261. See supra notes 219–223 (describing contemporary understandings of the motivations of 
sellers of sex). 
262. The treatment of indecent exposure in crimes involving moral turpitude jurisprudence 
bolsters this conclusion. When analyzing whether indecent exposure involves moral turpitude, the BIA 
focused on intent, holding that it does not involve moral turpitude when there is “no indication whether 
the exposure was to arouse the sexual desires of the parties concerned or with a lewd or lascivious 
intent . . . .” In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. 79, 82–83 (BIA 2013) (quoting In re P-, 2 I. &  
N. Dec. 117, 121 (BIA 1944)). This lewd intent “is what makes it ‘base, vile, or depraved, and contrary 
to the accepted rules of morality.’” In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 82–83 (quoting In re Ajami, 
22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (BIA 1999)). But see In re Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA 1965) (holding 
that renting a room with knowledge that it would be used for prostitution or lewdness was a crime 
involving moral turpitude). 
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all instances of prostitution involve base, vile, or depraved conduct, prostitution 
cannot categorically be a crime involving moral turpitude.263 
Moreover, prostitution does not involve moral turpitude because it is conduct 
that is malum prohibitum, as compared with an act that is malum in se.264 The Ninth 
Circuit, when concluding that statutory rape was not a crime involving moral 
turpitude, reasoned that the relevant criminal statute “proscribe[d] some conduct 
that is malum prohibitum.”265 The Ninth Circuit so reasoned for several reasons. First, 
it concluded the conduct was malum prohibitum because the sexual activity at issue 
would have been legal if the adult and minor were married, as provided in another 
section of the penal code.266 Second, the Ninth Circuit cited the fact that some of 
the conduct encompassed by the criminal statute is legal in other states.267 Third, 
the purpose of California’s statutory rape law “was not moral, so much as 
pragmatic—they were attempting to reduce teenage pregnancies.”268 For reasons 
similar to those cited by the Ninth Circuit, prostitution laws proscribe conduct that 
is malum prohibitum. Prostitution is now a public order or regulatory offense in many 
jurisdictions, aimed to maintain order and promote public health.269 Prostitution 
also is not universally criminalized—it is legal in parts of Nevada and in other 
countries.270 Because prostitution laws encompass conduct that is malum prohibitum, 
prostitution should not categorically be a crime involving moral turpitude. 
Finally, prostitution cannot be a crime involving moral turpitude simply 
because the sexual activity involves a commercial transaction.271 Such a rationale 
necessarily would encompass other activities like exotic or nude dancing that can 
involve sexual contact, which, like prostitution, involve payment for a sexual 
activity, albeit of a different nature. However, nude dancing, even where it is in 
violation of local law, has not been considered a crime involving moral turpitude.272 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rohit v. Holder is illustrative of the problems 
of concluding prostitution categorically involves moral turpitude and should not be 
 
263. See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that statutory rape 
is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude for several reasons, including the fact that not all 
conduct captured by the criminal statute involves moral turpitude). 
264. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between malum in se 
and malum prohibitium and its use in moral turpitude analysis). 
265. Quintero-Salazar, 506 F.3d at 693. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
270. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.354 (2017); Brief of Amicus, American Immigration Lawyers 
Ass’n at 19–21, In re R-S-S- (BIA 2012) (describing decriminalization and/or legalization of prostitution 
in other countries). 
271. See In re Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382, 386 (BIA 2018) (stating in dicta that 
prostitution involves moral turpitude because “of the socially degrading nature of commercialized 
sexual services . . . .”). 
272. Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. &  
N. Dec. 79, 85–86 (BIA 2013).  
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followed.273 Rohit explains that prostitution involves moral turpitude because it 
“always involves sexual exploitation.”274 The panel’s conclusion seems to have 
stemmed from the assumption that either all instances of prostitution are forced, or 
that prostitution can never be a voluntary choice and thus is always exploitative.275 
If the panel believed that all instances of prostitution are forced, this belief is 
factually incorrect. Although prostitution certainly can involve sexual exploitation, 
it is not the case that every instance of prostitution involves forced sex.276 
Additionally, this reading results in the punishment of the party that is being sexually 
exploited by triggering immigration consequences for noncitizens who sell sex. In 
other words, by triggering penalties for a noncitizen who sold sex, the court’s 
reasoning suggests that the noncitizen who is being exploited and forced to sell sex 
is the bad actor. Even if the panel acted under the assumption that prostitution can 
never be a voluntary choice, the same problem of punishing the victim arises. 
Because sellers of sex are generally no longer considered a serious threat to 
morality, and may be victims in certain cases, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
justify harsh immigration penalties for prostitution, especially in light of the 
pragmatic and doctrinal problems identified above. Congress and the courts should 
therefore take this opportunity to remove these outdated morality-based provisions 
from immigration law. 
CONCLUSION 
Prostitution-related immigration laws are some of the last remaining vestiges 
of morality-based immigration legislation enacted at the turn of the twentieth 
century. These laws are outdated and fail to take into account contemporary 
understandings, reflected in the criminal justice system, that prostitution is not a 
serious crime against morality, but rather that many individuals involved in 
prostitution are victims or sell sex for economic reasons. Additionally, prostitution-
related immigration laws continue to unfairly impact noncitizen women, making 
them more vulnerable to serious exploitation and abuse. These laws sow a distrust 
of the government, as women involved in prostitution are reluctant to report crimes 
to law enforcement for fear of penalties. Therefore, both to cleanse the law of the 
gendered and outdated notions of morality that continue to underpin these laws, 
and also to better protect this vulnerable population, immigration laws should 
dispose of penalties for the sale of sex. 
It is especially important to protect this vulnerable population today in light 
of the Trump administration’s scapegoating of noncitizens. Vociferous rhetoric 
 
273. See Rohit, 670 F.3d 1085. Although Rohit ultimately addressed the issue whether solicitation 
involves moral turpitude, it referenced prostitution in concluding that it does. See id.  
274. Id. at 1090. Rohit was attempting to distinguish prostitution from statutory rape, which the 
Ninth Circuit has held does not involve moral turpitude. See id. 
275. See supra notes 195–199 and accompanying text (describing the belief of some feminists 
and evangelical Christians that prostitution cannot be a voluntary choice). 
276. See, e.g., Valerie Jenness, From Sex as Sin to Sex as Work: COYOTE and the Reorganization 
of Prostitution as a Social Problem, 37 SOC. PROBS. 403, 405–06 (1990). 
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from the administration, especially President Trump himself, mirrors that from the 
turn of the twentieth century, branding noncitizens as undesirable and threats to 
American values. When he announced his presidential bid, Trump specifically 
referred to Mexican immigrants as “people that have lots of problems” and who are 
“bringing crime.”277 In a July 2017 speech in Poland, he spoke of threats to the 
“West,” including “dire threats . . . to our way of life.” He specifically spoke of 
“Americans, Poles, and the nations of Europe” working together to “confront 
forces, whether they come from inside or out, from the South or the East, that 
threaten over time to undermine these values and to erase the bonds of culture, 
faith and tradition that make us who we are.”278 This rhetoric, which mirrors that 
from the turn of the century, is being translated to action, resulting in widespread 
targeting of noncitizens through immigration laws and policies. The Trump 
administration has shown no restraint. Unfettered discretion has allowed the 
government to use immigration laws against unpopular groups. During these 
increasingly tumultuous times the reforms outlined in this Article will provide some 
protection to noncitizens suspected of selling sex, an especially vulnerable 
population accused of conduct society no longer views under the same lens as it did 
around the turn of the twentieth century, by ensuring that they are squarely outside 
of the freely exercised discretionary power of the Trump administration and are no 
longer subject to immigration penalties. 
 
 
277. Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST, June 16,  
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-
trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/ [https://perma.cc/BVP6-DAN9]. 
278. Trump’s Speech in Warsaw (Full Transcript, Video), CNN ( July 6, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/07/06/politics/trump-speech-poland-transcript/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z4HW-7AZG]. 
